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POPULAR AGITATION AND BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY REFORM,
1866-1867.
Michael D. Snell-Feikema (History)
Dr. Larry Witherell, Faculty Mentor (History)
This paper demonstrated that the force of public opinion as expressed by pro-reform
agitations played a critical role in the attainment of working-class voting rights with the
Reform Act of 1867. This Reform Act, which passed after more than a year of political
disputes and public demands, gave most of the urban English working class the right to
vote. In 1866 a modest reform bill sponsored by William Gladstone’s Liberal government
had been defeated by a combination of Conservative and conservative Liberal
opposition. After months of popular demonstrations, Benjamin Disraeli’s new
Conservative government introduced another reform bill that initially was very restrictive.
But after further public demonstrations and political conflict in parliament, the bill
emerged as a radical measure that more than doubled the size of the electorate. The paper
followed the course of the reform controversy and public agitations, and established
that the working-class agitations in favor of parliamentary reform were a critical
force in compelling parliament to enact comprehensive working class enfranchisement.
The project used original source material, including the parliamentary debates,
The Times and the Manchester Guardian, working class and radical newspapers
such as the Beehive, Commonwealth and the National Reformer, magazines such as
Blackwood’s, Contemporary Review, and Quarterly Review, trade union minutes,
memoirs, speeches, and private letters.
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Popular Agitations and British Parliamentary Reform, 1866-1867.
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May 2005
The Parliamentary Reform Act of 1867 was one of the most important events in British
political history. Radical in its scope, it doubled the size of the electorate and for the first
time brought large segments of the working class into the political process. Its passage
was characterized by a sudden reversal on the part of the political classes. A year earlier,
a modest reform bill sponsored by William Gladstone’s Liberal government had been
defeated by a combination of Conservative and conservative Liberal opposition, on the
grounds that it was dangerously democratic. In early 1867, the new Conservative
minority government, led by Benjamin Disraeli, belatedly initiated its own Reform bill.
Initially, the bill was even more limited than Gladstone’s, but by the time it became law it
had been broadened into a radical measure which made the working class a majority
among urban voters.
During the course of this reversal, there was a powerful working-class movement
to attain the suffrage. Led for the most part by trade unionists, through an organization
called the Reform League, this movement fought for a large extension of the vote to the
English working class. The Reform League campaign featured numerous, frequent, and
massive demonstrations throughout the country. These demonstrations were comparable
in size to those of the Chartists, but were strengthened by better unity and organization
and by a tactical alliance with a more moderate movement led by middle-class Liberals.
The fact that a party which had previously opposed even modest Reform1 would, after
1

During the period in question, alteration of the electoral franchise was typically referred
to simply as “Reform”, usually capitalized.
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many months of this agitation, produce a bill which the working-class movement found
largely satisfactory, would seem to indicate that the agitations played a very large role in
that reversal. Historians, however, have been divided as to what degree the agitations
effected the eventual outcome of the controversy.
John Morley, in his 1903 biography, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone,
devotes a chapter to the events leading up to the 1867 Reform Act. In venturing an
explanation for what he calls the “strange reversal”, he ascribes it to the popular
agitations and change in public opinion. He notes that the same ruling class fear of the
populace that made them dread reform made them easily frightened by the massive
Reform demonstrations. His discussion of the agitations, however, is very brief, his main
focus being the actions of Gladstone and Disraeli.2 The 1920 biography, The Life of
Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, by William Monypenny and G.E. Buckle,
devotes little space to the public demonstrations, but notes that Disraeli created his
Reform bill as a response to public opinion and the agitations.3
Joseph H. Park’s 1920 book, The English Reform Bill of 1867, was the first
historical study of the 1867 Reform Act. Park considers many factors in explaining the
Act, but gives the agitations a significant role. He argues that the Reform demonstrations
of 1866-1867, while largely peaceful, were a demonstration of organization and strength
which implied the forces that could be unleashed if resolution was not forthcoming.4 He
argues that public opinion forced parliament to enact a Reform bill, and one more
sweeping than the 1866 bill, but is uncertain whether they forced Disraeli to go as far as
he did.5 He also gives considerable weight to the effects of the competition between the
parties and to Disraeli’s political machinations. He gives the major credit to Disraeli, who
responded to public opinion and passed a bill, both for enlightened reasons and political
gain.6 Park devotes greater space to the Reform agitations than most subsequent literature
on the 1867 Reform Act, although he apparently made very little use of labor sources,
relying instead primarily on mainstream periodicals.
The first work specifically focusing on the role of the trade unions in the Reform
question was a 1925 essay by Carl F. Brand. It follows the movement of British labor
away from the “no politics” policy of the 1850s, in which the trade unions avoided
political concerns and focused entirely on organization and labor disputes, to involvement
in politics by taking part in the Reform movement of 1866-1867. He argues that this took
2

John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Volume II (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1903), 226-227.
3

William Monypenny and George E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of
Beaconsfield. Vol. IV, 1855-1868 (London: J. Murray, 1910-20), 487.
4

Joseph H. Park, The English Reform Bill of 1867 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1920), 7-8.
5

Ibid., 123-125.

6

Ibid., 232-237.
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place partly due to the encouragement of Liberal politicians such as Gladstone and Bright
and partly due to the legal difficulties labor faced at the time, which could only be
remedied by parliamentary action. He concluded that the strength of the Reform
agitations, and the danger of unrest if Reform demands were not met, persuaded
parliament to enact a bill providing household suffrage. However, he spends relatively
little space proving this, his main focus being the adoption of the Reform issue by the
trade unionists.7
Frances E. Gillespie’s 1927 book, Labor and Politics in England, 1850-1867,
extensively discusses the issue of Reform, leading up to and including the agitations of
1866-1867, from the perspective of the trade unions. She credits the working-class
Reform agitations and the force of public opinion, in the midst of a tense atmosphere
accompanied by economic recession, with forcing both Liberals and Conservatives to
enact a sweeping Reform bill. The main focus is on the movement itself, and little space
is given to demonstrating the effect of the agitations on the climate of opinion.8
By contrast, Francis H. Herrick, in a 1934 essay, explained the Reform bill mainly
in terms of party competition, the radical nature of the Bill being due to Disraeli’s need to
compensate for his party’s minority status by allying with the Radicals. He attached
relatively little importance to the agitations.9 A subsequent article by Herrick, in 1949,
followed the debates about reform among the political class during the years leading up
to the 1867 Act. According to Herrick, the issue remained alive during these years, in
spite of public apathy, because it was pushed by Radical MPs and because some saw it as
a way of ending the deadlock between the parties. Both of Herrick’s articles largely
ignore the role of public opinion and popular agitations.10
There was a flurry of new work on the 1867 Reform Act during the 1960s, much
of it holding widely divergent views. A leftist perspective was taken by Royden Harrison
in a 1962 essay concerning the relationship between revolution and Reform in 1867.
Harrison argued that the working-class reform agitations forced the government to make
concessions in the form of a radical reform bill. He places particular emphasis on the
Hyde Park Reform demonstration of 6 May 1867, which he argues was a humiliation for
the Conservative government and a demonstration of working-class power that played a
major role in forcing parliament to capitulate on Reform. Behind the victory was the
increasing strength, organization, and prosperity of the working class, which on the one
hand made them too powerful to ignore but also made them sufficiently committed to the

7

Carl F. Brand, “The Conversion of the British Trade-Unions to Political Action”, The
American Historical Review, 30:2 (Jan. 1925), 251-270.

8

Frances E. Gillespie, Labor and Politics in England, 1850-1867 (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1927), 235-288.
9

Francis H. Herrick, “The Reform Bill of 1867 and the British Party System”, Pacific
Historical Review, 3 (June 1934), 216-233.
10

Francis H. Herrick, “The Second Reform Movement in Britain 1850-1865”, Journal of
the History of Ideas, 9:2 (Apr. 1948), 174-192.
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existing society that they could be trusted with the vote.11 The governing classes, argues
Harrison, chose to concede to the agitations rather than resisting them because the
working classes had “attained precisely that level of development at which it was safe to
concede its enfranchisement and dangerous to withhold it.”12
Since Harrison’s work, most writing on the 1867 Reform Act has given
considerably less weight to the agitations. Instead, they have tended to follow the
approach of Herrick, in assigning the greatest importance to party competition. Francis
B. Smith’s 1966 book, The Making of the Second Reform Bill, accorded a significant role
to the public agitations, but his primary focus was upon the activities of the politicians.
For Smith, a major factor was Disraeli’s determination to carry a Reform bill, the form of
which was less critical than its successfulness, in order to defeat Gladstone and
consolidate his own leadership. Smith also emphasizes the role played by confusion,
arguing that confusing laws and unreliable statistics made it difficult for MPs to control
the level of enfranchisement. Most of the safeguards against democracy in Disraeli’s
original bill were, he argues, flawed and unworkable, making their removal inevitable.
Although he spends less time discussing them, he also accords a significant if
secondary role to the Reform agitations, which he credits with lending urgency to the
Reform issue. He argues that the radicalization of the bill would have been impossible
without the agitations, and that they in the end forced parliament to accept the bill in its
radical form. 13 However, he also argues that they “did not precipitate it and . . . had no
direct influence in shaping it.” They achieved a wide extension of the franchise “more
through the Government’s ill construction of its Bill than by their importunity”.14 Smith
spends a relatively small portion of his book discussing the agitations, and even less to
the role of the trade unions and the views of the working class.
Maurice Cowling’s 1967 book, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The
Passing of the Second Reform Bill, followed in more extensive fashion the approach of
Herrick. The book focuses heavily on attempting to ascertain the motives of politicians,
and sees the central concern as being the allocation of political power within the
parliamentary realm. The level of the franchise is seen as being of secondary importance.
In lowering it, the politicians were not making concessions to popular pressure, and were
confident that doing so would not effect ruling class dominance. The parliamentary
world is seen as insulated from outside pressures, and the connection between “external
pressures” and “the closed world in which decisions were taken” is seen as so difficult to

11

Royden Harrison, “The 10th April of Spencer Walpole: The Problem of Revolution in
Relation to Reform, 1865-1867”, International Review of Social History, 7:3 (1962), 351399; reprinted in Royden Harrison, Before the Socialists: Studies in Labour and Politics,
1861-1881 (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1965), 78-136.
12

Ibid., 133.
Francis B. Smith, The Making of the Second Reform Bill (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1966).
13

14

Ibid., 234-235
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determine that “no necessity can be predicated of the one in relation to the other”.15 He
denies any “capitulation to popular pressure”.16 Instead, Disraeli was forced to accept a
radical bill because of party conditions. The split in the Conservative cabinet in
February, and the inability to cooperate with conservative Whigs, is claimed to have
forced Disraeli to cooperate with the Radicals. Historians such as Harrison are seen as
seriously exaggerating the importance of the agitations. 17
Gertrude Himmelfarb, in a 1966 essay on the 1867 Reform Act, attempted to
explain the issue in terms of conservative ideology, and was even more dismissive of the
agitations. She argues that Disraeli and the Conservatives pursued radical suffrage reform
not out of political expediency or fear of public protests, but for ideological reasons. The
Conservatives, she argues, were not afraid of granting votes to the working class, because
of their faith in the traditional order of British society. They believed that the working
class would continue to defer to their “betters”, and that many working-class voters
would vote for Conservatives due to their reverence for Britain’s traditional aristocracy.
The Liberals, she argues, were the ones who were fearful of enfranchising the working
class, because they saw society as made up of competing groups acting out of selfinterest, and hence feared that a working class with a majority of votes would use that
power against the upper classes. She attaches little significance to the Reform agitations,
arguing that their importance has been exaggerated. She argues that the Hyde Park
incident of July 1866 was a minor incident, and attacks Harrison’s assertion that the 6
May 1867 demonstration represented a major defeat for the Conservative government.
She denies that the Reform agitations forced Parliament to accept radical Reform.18
Although Himmelfarb’s thesis has not been widely accepted, most writing on the
Reform Act since then has accorded relatively little importance to the agitations. John
Vincent touches upon the Reform question in his 1966 book, The Formation of the
Liberal Party, 1857-1868. He emphasizes that most Liberals during this period were
hostile to democracy and lukewarm about Reform, that many Liberals only acquiesced to
it for political reasons, and that even Liberal Reform advocates wanted only a limited
extension encompassing the wealthier artisans. He discounts the importance of the whole
issue, as being over “whether Radical MPs in the towns should have more voters to
manage”.19
Robert M. Stewart devotes the final chapter in his 1978 book, The Foundation of
the Conservative Party, 1830-1867, to the 1867 Reform Act. He dismisses the arguments
of both Harrison and Himmelfarb. While acknowledging that public opinion encouraged
the Conservative government to act, he rejects the idea that radical reform was the result
15

Ibid., 340.
Ibid., 310.
17
Maurice Cowling, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the
Second Reform Bill (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967).
18
Gertrude Himmelfarb, “The Politics of Democracy: The English Reform Act of 1867”,
The Journal of British Studies, 6:1 (Nov. 1966), 97-138.
16

19

John Russell Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857-1868 (London:
Constable, 1966), 189-194, 250-256.
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of fear of the agitations. Likewise, he argues that there is little evidence that the
Conservatives believed it was desirable to enfranchise the working man prior to the Act.
He gives greater credence to the idea that it was the result of a Conservative desire for
victory after years of defeat. The agitations are mentioned only in passing.20
A 1980 article by Thomas F. Gallagher covers much the same ground as Herrick’s
1949 article. He sees the Reform Act as being the result of a 19-year struggle within the
political classes, sustained by party disunity, pressure by Radicals, and pledges by
moderates. He does credit the reform agitations with finally forcing parliament to deal
with the issue, but he spends little time discussing them.21
Liberty, Retrenchment, and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone,
1860-1880, Eugenio F. Biagini’s 1992 study of popular Liberalism, also touches upon the
Reform movement. Biagini emphasizes the “moral and emotional character” of the
agitations. He emphasizes the role of the insulting rhetoric of Lowe and others, their
defense against such charges by Gladstone and Bright, and the desire to assert the
respectability of the working class, in arousing popular fervor and shaping the character
of the demonstrations. He also discusses the ideological basis of the Reformers,
emphasizing that their concept of manhood suffrage excluded paupers, criminals, and
those lacking in moral character and independence. Biagini does not attempt to gauge the
effects of the agitations on the Reform issue itself.22
A recent addition to scholarship on the 1867 Reform Act has been made by
Kristin Zimmerman in a 2003 essay about the role of “Palmerstonian delay”. She argues
that many Liberals in the period up to 1866 were privately lukewarm or unfriendly to
Reform, but publicly expressed support of it in order to improve their electoral fortunes.
These public expressions of support towards Reform made it difficult for them to oppose
it when it became a pressing issue. Prior to 1866, they attempted to avoid Reform by
evasion and delay, but in 1866 and 1867 the force of public opinion and the prodding of
pro-Reform Liberals forced these reluctant individuals to acquiesce to Reform. Although
devoting little space to the agitations themselves, Zimmerman’s article does demonstrate
the impact of public opinion in influencing reluctant Liberals in 1867.23
The approach of historians such as Cowling and Smith, seeing the 1867 Reform
Act as primarily the result of high politics within parliament, has become the dominant

20

Robert M. Stewart, The Foundation of the Conservative Party, 1830-1867 (London:
Longman, 1978), 352-366.
21

Thomas F. Gallagher, “The Second Reform Movement, 1848-1867”, Albion, 12:2
(1980), 147-163.
22

Eugenio F. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment, and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age
of Gladstone, 1860-1880 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 257-288.
23

Kristin Zimmerman, “Liberal Speech, Palmerstonian Delay, and the Passage of the
Second Reform Act”, The English Historical Review, 118:479 (Nov. 2003), 1176-1207.
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one in recent times. The working-class agitations have been given a secondary role.24 It
is unfortunate that so much recent scholarship on the 1867 Reform Act has minimized or
neglected the role of the agitations, because the passage of the Act is inexplicable without
them.
During the period after the collapse of Chartism, opinion among the governing
classes was so inimical to widespread enfranchisement that only extremely limited
Reform bills were proposed, all of which met with failure. This state of affairs had
changed little when Gladstone’s bill was created, and it too met with failure. The fact
that the same parliament that had found Gladstone’s limited 1866 bill excessive was able
to bring itself to enact household suffrage in 1867 can only be explained by a sweeping
change in the political climate. And the only factor that can fully explain this
transformation is the development of a large, well organized, highly motivated workingclass movement for enfranchisement. While it is certainly true that Disraeli was eager to
outmaneuver the Liberals and put an end to his party’s minority status, the course he
pursued in doing so was largely the product of the political climate that the agitations had
created. The agitations created a widespread conviction that a final and definitive
settlement of the Reform question must be enacted. The Conservatives were thus obliged
to deal with the Reform question, and in a way that satisfied the working class enough to
end the agitations.
The period leading up to 1866 had been largely characterized by relative political
quiescence on the part of the working class. The Chartist movement, with its mass
demonstrations and petitions, had fallen into eclipse with the failure of Feargus
O’Connor’s demonstration in 1848. Working-class agitation for the vote continued only
in a much-diminished fashion.25 The working class was more successful in organizing
trade unions, which grew impressively during this period, but most of these had strict
rules against involvement in politics.26 The working class showed little enthusiasm for
24

Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation:
Class, Race, Gender and the Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 7; Paul Smith, “’Leap in the Dark’: The 1867 Reform Act”, Modern
History Review, 2:1 (Sept. 1990), 27-29; Graham Goodlad, “Disraeli and the MidVictorian Conservative Party: Seeking a Way out of the Political Wilderness?”, Modern
History Review, 13:1 (Sept. 2001), 26-29.
25

John Breuilly, Gottfried Niedhart and Antony Taylor, eds. The Era of the Reform
League: English Labour and Radical Politics 1857-1872. Documents Selected by Gustav
Mayer (Mannheim: Palatium Verlag im J & J. Verlag, 1995), 15.
26

Brand, “Political Action”, 251. Suffrage during this period was based upon the Reform
Act of 1832, which had rationalized the archaic, confused electoral system then in place,
and had increased the power of the middle class in relation to the aristocracy. Small and
corrupt boroughs controlled by local aristocrats had been reduced in number, and new
urban boroughs created in their place. In the boroughs all males who rented or owned a
house worth more than £10 a year were given the vote. This enfranchised most of the
middle class but largely excluded the working class, which had previously been able to
vote in some localities. In the counties, in addition to the old 40 shilling freeholder
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the parliamentary efforts at Reform during this period, which were invariably of a very
limited nature. The Liberals tended to focus on small decreases of the rental qualification
for the franchise, while the Conservatives tended to focus on creating “fancy franchises”
that admitted favored groups in on the basis of education, wealth, or employment.
Reform Bills had been introduced in 1852, 1854, 1859, and 1860, but nothing had come
of them. These bills were mainly motivated by politicians seeking political advantage
within a divided parliament, whether by attracting smaller groups such as the Radicals to
their side, or by changing the electorate in such a way as to favor their own party.27
The mid-1860s, however, saw the development of a new working-class movement
for the vote. Where Chartism had failed, this movement would to a substantial degree
succeed. Several factors explain this greater degree of success. The working class had
achieved greater clout during the 1860s, due to its increasing prosperity and education,
and its increasingly powerful trade unions, who had begun to take an interest in political
issues. The pragmatic and moderate nature of the trade unionists, and the “labor
aristocracy” they represented, enabled a limited cooperation with the radical wing of the
Liberal party, who had come to support a limited enfranchisement of the working class. If
their aims differed somewhat from that of the working-class Reformers, Liberal support
did help them attain their goals. Unlike the Chartists, they had reason to expect that
parliament might meet at least part of their demands.
The working class of the mid-1860s presented a different picture from the
working class that had animated the Chartists in the 1830s and 40s. It was significantly
more prosperous and increasingly better educated.28 The trade union movement had
progressed as well. The small, localized unions of the past were increasingly superceded
by large, centralized “new model” unions.29 These unions tended to be dominated by the
prosperous “labor aristocracy” of skilled mechanics, rather than the mass of poorly paid
unskilled workers, who remained largely non-unionized.30 If the working class of this
period was increasingly well-organized and prosperous, it was also less radical than in the
past. The new unionists largely rejected the ideas of social reconstruction, and of
political and social utopianism, which had characterized Chartism.31 They felt that
conflict between labor and capital could be avoided through compromise,32 and defended
franchise, the vote was given to those who were copyholders or long-term leaseholders
for £10 a year, and to short-term leaseholders and tenants-at-will at £50 a year.
27

Herrick, “Second Reform Movement”, 184-190.

28

Gillespie, Labor and Politics, 197-201.

29

Irving Garbati, “British Trade Unionism in the Mid-Victorian Era”, The University of
Toronto Quarterly, 20:1 (Oct. 1950), 69-70.
30

Ibid., 82.

31

Ibid., 71.

32

Ibid., 72.
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trade unions within the terms of the dominant laissez-faire ideology,33 although these
arguments were generally not accepted by the upper classes.34
The trade unions were increasingly powerful and were increasingly organized on
a national scale.35 This trend culminated with the formation of the London Trades
Council in 1860.36 The London Trades Council came to be dominated by a group of
likeminded men who labor historians have labeled “the Junta”. These individualsRobert Applegarth37, George Odger38, William Allan39, and others- shared a belief in
political agitation by trade unions that set them apart from the older unionists, who
followed a rule of “no politics. As the Webbs put it, “they believed that a leveling down
of all political privileges, and the opening out of educational and social opportunities to
all classes of the community, would bring in its train a large measure of economic
equality”. They pushed British unions towards involvement in numerous political issues,
from education and mine regulation to full legalization of unions and the extension of the
vote to working men.40 Their leadership of British labor was challenged by George

33

Ibid., 81.

34

Ibid., 76-80.

35

Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1987),
47-48.

36

Ibid., 52.

37

Robert Applegarth (1834-1924). Secretary of Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and
Joiners (1862), member of London Trades Council, and strong advocate of political
agitation by unions. Campaigned for the Master and Servant Act of 1867, testified for
the 1867 Royal Commission on Trade Unions, and supported the Reform League.
38

George Odger (1813-1877). Shoemaker, trade unionist, and onetime Chartist, became
secretary of the London Trades Council in 1862. Noted for his eloquence and his
impressive self-taught education, played important role in formation of International
Working Men’s Association and the Reform League. In 1866, founded the weekly labor
paper The Commonwealth, which styled itself “the Organ of the Reform Movement”.
39

William Allan (1813-1874). Railroad mechanic, leading figure in formation of
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (1851) and London Trades Council, and supporter of
Reform League. Lead opposition to Hornby vs. Close court ruling and testified for the
Royal Commission on Trade Unions in 1867.
40

Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (New York: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1920), 233-241.
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Potter41, the editor of the leading labor weekly, The Beehive. While Potter and the Junta
disagreed acrimoniously over issues such as strike policy, both shared an interest in
political action.42 Their interest stemmed from several sources. In spite of their
increasing strength, the legal position of unions remained highly insecure. If a union
engaged in a strike, it was vulnerable to prosecution under the common law of
conspiracy. Their very status as legal entities was uncertain, as it depended upon their
falsifying their rules so as to qualify for protection under the Friendly Societies Act.43 It
was feared- not without good reason, as it turned out- that a hostile government
controlled by the wealthy classes might try to ban strikes altogether, or declare unions to
be illegal entities.44
Another grievance of unions was the prevailing Master and Servant Law, which
governed contracts between employers and their employees. As it stood, the law was
patently biased in favor of the employer. If the latter violated his part of the contract, he
was liable to civil charges. If the employee broke his contract, however, his employer
could have him prosecuted criminally and sent to jail. The justices involved were often
employers themselves, and the employee was not allowed to be a witness in their own
defense. Thousands of workers were prosecuted under the law each year.45
Aside from these directly pressing matters, there was a belief among trade
unionists that the franchise might be a tool for improving the lot of the working classes in
general. In 1862 The Beehive, the leading trade union newspaper, declared that the
suffrage was desired “as a social necessity to combat the deteriorating influences of
society, the diminishing earnings of the great body of the people, and their gradually
increasing outlay on the necessities of existence.”46 Odger later said, “give [the workingclass] votes, and they would see that the poor man’s daughter, who was worked twelve,
fourteen, sixteen hours a-day, should have time to go abroad and view the face of nature.
They would prevent the poor man’s child from going in early life into mines and
workshops before it was educated. They would prevent the poor agricultural laborer from
working for 8s. per week”.47
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The aims of the working-class leaders were made manifest in 1863, with the
creation of the Manhood Suffrage and Vote by Ballot Association by Applegarth, Odger,
George Howell and others. Asserting that “all the evils under which we suffer have a
common origin, namely, an excess of political power in the hands of those holding a
higher social position”, it proposed to remedy that situation with trade union agitation.
Although the association initially accomplished little, the movement for Reform by the
trade unionists was now under way.48
A further impetus for Reform was added by the development of a useful if at
times strained relationship with advanced middle-class Liberals, mainly Radicals. The
middle-class Reformers wanted an enfranchisement of the more prosperous portion of the
working class, who they felt could be trusted with the vote. Possession of the vote, it was
felt, would give them a stake in the nation and make them less likely to vent their
grievances in the form of trade unions and strikes. Combined with a redistribution of
parliamentary seats, it would also increase the power of urban industrial interests at the
expense of the landed aristocratic element.49 John Bright, their most prominent member,
complained: “There is no greater fallacy than . . . that the middle classes are in possession
of power. The working men are almost universally excluded from power . . . and the
middle class, while they have the semblance of it, are defrauded of the reality.”50 John
Bright was perhaps an unlikely candidate for being an advocate of the working class.
The great Manchester free trader had been vocal in his hostility to factory legislation and
trade unions.51 He came, however, to see the working class as a potential ally in his
opposition to the power of the landed aristocracy.52 He argued that the more working men
felt that they had political and legal equality with their employers and all other classes,
the less they would be inclined to struggle against “the greatest friends they had in the
world- the capitalists”.53 In 1860, he rather hesitantly defended the legitimacy and
potential value of trade unions, while at the same time asserting that strikes were in most
cases bad. 54 Later, he suggested that existing working-class organizations, including
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trade unions, be used to agitate for Reform.55 In 1864 Bright56 formed the Reform Union,
an organization of middle-class Liberal Reformers, advocating household suffrage.57
Both groups awaited an opportunity for fruitful action. Prospects seemed grim
during the premiership of Lord Palmerston, a conservative Liberal who was both popular
and staunchly anti-Reform. One encouraging development, however, came in 1864 with
the conversion of Palmerston’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Gladstone.58 Early
in that year, Odger met with Gladstone, and complained of the injustice suffered by the
working class in being excluded from the franchise. Gladstone promised that something
would be done.59 Soon afterwards, in a debate in Commons concerning a Radical
proposal to lower the borough suffrage, he announced that “every man who is not
incapacitated by some consideration of moral unfitness or political danger, is morally
entitled to come within the pale of the constitution.” Gladstone hedged this broad
statement with strong qualifications about the dangers of sudden change.60 These
qualifications, however, were generally ignored by the working-class Reformers, who
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received the speech enthusiastically. The Beehive gladly hailed Gladstone’s “entry on the
radical reform road” and promised to “render him every assistance in [their] power.”61
The formation of the Reform League was initially precipitated by the action of a
group of Liberals. These included several Radical MPs, such as Bright, Richard Cobden,
W.E. Forster,62 and P.A. Taylor,63 as well as the radical barrister Edmund Beales64 and
the wealthy radical philanthropist Samuel Morley.65 These individuals indicated that if
working-class organizations such as the trade unions and friendly societies were willing
to join in an agitation for the extension of the franchise, they would be willing to fund a
new association for such a purpose, to be lead by a Liberal MP. They sent a circular to
about 250 working-class leaders to discuss the proposition.66
The resulting meeting included, among numerous labor leaders, the entire Junta,
as well as members of the First International and several small Reform organizations.
Beales and Mason Jones represented the middle class radicals. Potter argued in favor of a
new Reform organization to pursue a “vigorous agitation” in favor of manhood suffrage
and the ballot. Those present, with “enthusiasm and unanimity”, approved the creation of
the Reform League. A deputation was appointed to meet with middle-class Radicals and
seek their cooperation.67
The results of this meeting, however, were not especially successful. Of the
sixteen MPs who had promised to attend, only four were present, and of these only two
would go along with the League’s program. John Bright, who earlier had appeared to
advocate manhood suffrage, greatly disappointed the delegates by failing to commit to
61
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the League’s program while evasively admitting that it was justified. A resolution
censuring Bright was rejected out of fear of alienating one of their few potential middleclass allies, but it was decided that the working class must “entirely depend upon
themselves” if they were to obtain their objectives.68 The Reform League hence became a
largely working-class organization, independent of the middle-class Liberals. Beales,
however, had accepted the working-class program, and was made president of the
organization.69 George Howell was made its secretary.70
A political opening for the new Reform movement was soon provided by the
death of Lord Palmerston in October 1865. The staunchly anti-Reform Whig prime
minister was finally out of the way, to be replaced by Lord John Russell, a previous
advocate of moderate Reform.71 Benjamin Disraeli commented, “If Johnny [Russell] is
the man, there will be a Reform Bill . . . The truce of parties is over. I foresee
tempestuous times, and great vicissitudes in public life.”72 Beales and Odger met with
the new prime minister in January, where he promised that his ministry would stand or
fall on a Reform measure.73 Gladstone soon began drafting a new Reform Bill, which he
introduced to the House of Commons on 12 March 1866.
The bill, similar to its ill-fated predecessors, was a distinctly limited measure. In
the boroughs, the annual household rental requirement for the vote was lowered from £10
to £7, while in the counties it fell from £50 to £14. It also introduced a £10 rental
franchise for lodgers. The bill proposed to enfranchise about 400,000 new voters, only
half of them working class, increasing the electorate to a total of 1.3 million out of
England and Wales’s 5.3 million adult males. To those who argued that the bill had not
gone far enough, Gladstone responded that it would be a “dangerous temptation” for the
working classes to be “invested with preponderating power”. To those who thought it
went too far, he argued that it would settle the question for a considerable period.74
The Reform League was rather disappointed by the Liberal bill, and their support
was initially rather tepid. Some in the League found it so inadequate that they wanted it
68
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opposed, but most believed that it was better than nothing and perhaps the best that could
be expected to pass, given the expected resistance of Conservatives and “sham Liberals”
in parliament. It was decided to support the bill, with reservations about its
insufficiency.75 Bright, who had suggested to Gladstone that he adopt either a £6 limit or
household suffrage76, lauded it as “an honest bill”. While it might be “the least the
Government could offer”, it was perhaps “the greatest which the Government could carry
through parliament”.77
As limited as the bill was, the Conservatives largely disapproved of it. Partly, it
was seen as an attack on the landed interest and on the electoral basis of the Conservative
party. There was particular unease over measures that let Liberal-leaning urban voters
spill into the Conservative strongholds in the counties.78 Lord Cranborne79 argued that
the bill’s moderation was deceptive. He believed that it was designed to give the Liberals
enough of an edge over the landed interest that they could push further innovations later
on, and quoted John Bright as advocating moderate Reform for just that reason.80 They
were also largely opposed to granting more power to the working class. Lord Cranborne
complained of “their power of combination, their ignorance of economic laws, their
strong taste for the despotism of numbers”.81 More moderate commentators were less
vitriolic but shared his resistance. The Conservative Blackwood’s Magazine, although
ready to welcome those working men who qualified for the current franchise, argued that
it was unwise to give them too much power- for some working men formed dangerous
trade unions, while others were given to idleness and excess of food and drink.82
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As Lord Cranborne later put it, “the danger of lowering the franchise even to £6
or £7, because it would give to the working classes a preponderating power, was one on
which the Conservative speakers constantly dwelt”.83 Benjamin Disraeli84 was relatively
moderate in his words, but agreed that the bill excessive. He conceded that the working
class might deserve a fairer representation in the Constitution, and needled Bright for his
past opposition to factory legislation, but attacked Gladstone for advocating democratic
principles, arguing that the House of Commons should “not become a House of the
People, a House of a mere indiscriminate multitude”. Working-class predominance, he
warned, would lead to mob rule and class war.85
Opposition to the bill was not limited to the Conservatives. A portion of the
Liberals opposed the bill as well. Soon dubbed “the Cave of Adullam”, it was dominated
by aristocratic Whigs such as Lord Elcho and Lord Grosvenor.86 The most outspoken
“Adullamite”, however, was Robert Lowe,87 who soon gained great notoriety for the
force of his invective. He made little attempt to hide his true feelings about the working
class, and the following words from one of his speeches were to become famous for their
Quarterly Review. Wrote prolifically, mainly historical and literary works, including a
biography of Wellington, who he knew personally and served under. A “strong
conservative in politics”, but took little part in it except in opposing 1832 Reform Act.
Curate (1820), chaplain of Chelsea Hospital (1834), chaplain-general of the forces (18441875), Inspector-general of military schools (1846-1857), and Prebendary of Willesden in
St. Paul’s Cathedral (1848-1888). Dictionary of National Biography, vol.7 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1949-1950), 1303-1304.
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insulting vitriol: “If you want venality, if you want ignorance, if you want drunkenness,
and facility for being intimidated; or if, on the other hand, you want impulsive,
unreflecting, violent people, where do you look for them in the constituencies? Do you go
to the top or to the bottom?”
Lowe went on to prophesize that the working class, backed by their trade unions, would
soon use their voting rights against the upper classes.88 Blackwood’s hailed Lowe’s
“classic wit” and “sound reasoning”, agreeing that it was an “insane notion” to look for
“integrity and honesty of purpose” among those the Bill would enfranchise.89 The
Conservative members “cheered till they were hoarse in honour of Mr. Lowe”.90
Another Liberal, Samuel Laing, claimed that the franchise ought to be held only
by those “whose ability to act upon solid sense and reflection rather than from
inconsiderate impulse might be presumed upon”, and felt that the current £10 franchise
“drew that line in a general way very clearly and very distinctly”. He argued that the £10
franchise was “a motive for good conduct and provident habits”, and that if it were
lowered, those “of not so high a character would be admitted”.91 One well-known Liberal
professor, arguing that the bill threatened to destroy the English constitution, counseled
that “they must put some check on the democratic movement, or they must go to
perdition”.92 Even among those Liberals who did not openly oppose the bill, there was
said to be much hostility. One commentator complained that many nominal supporters of
the government, elected on promises to support Reform, “were really quite as strongly
opposed to any strong and vigorous measure . . . as the Conservatives . . . and were
determined . . . to get rid of the question . . . or defer it”.93 Much of the press was
opposed. The leading Tory papers, the Standard and the Herald, thought the bill went
too far in lowering the franchise, while The Times, in milder fashion, also expressed
dissatisfaction with it.94
Countering the bill’s opponents, Bright argued that attempting to exclude the
working man from the franchise would only produce animosity, and cautioned that if
moderate change were rejected, the governing classes might find themselves one day
compelled to go further, and under threat of violence.95 Gladstone’s appeals became
88
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increasingly emotional. “You cannot fight the future”, he thundered, “time is on our side.
The great social forces which move onwards in their might and majesty . . . are against
you”.96 The working class, he said, were “our fellow-subjects, our fellow-Christians, our
own flesh and blood”.97 This rhetoric would greatly endear him to the working classes
but did little to persuade his opponents in parliament. The combination of Conservative
and Adullamite opposition proved too strong for the bill, and it was defeated by hostile
amendments.
In the wake of this defeat, the Liberal government resigned on 26 June 1866.
Although Gladstone wanted a dissolution, the cabinet as a whole opposed it.98 There was
some initial expectation of an anti-Reform coalition government consisting of
Conservatives and conservative Liberals, but the two groups proved unable to work
together, and so Lord Derby came to head a Conservative minority government.
Benjamin Disraeli, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, lead the party in Commons.99
The new government avoided committing itself to any policy on Reform. One
Conservative commentator noted that, while it might be tempting for the government to
attempt a limited and illusory Reform bill in cooperation with conservative Liberals, the
best course was to let the question sleep entirely.100
The Reform League and Reform Union had not been idle during debates over the
bill, and Gladstone could claim 100 public meetings and a half-million signatures in favor
of it.101 One meeting in April, in St. Martin’s Hall, had been so popular that it had
overflowed into the streets.102 In March, Potter had formed his own organization, the
London Working Men’s Association, to agitate for Reform and other issues relevant to
trade unions, and had staged a demonstration in April that included the heads of 16
unions.103
Nonetheless, it was common for those who opposed Reform to claim the working
class was indifferent about the issue.104 In March, one commentator warned that the
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absence of agitation by the working classes was not due to any indifference for it on their
part. Rather, he argued, it was because they had “a perfect confidence that the carrying of
a measure of Reform is but a question of time. Should anything occur to disturb that
confidence, those who maintain the indifference of the people would find themselves
unpleasantly startled from their fond belief.”105
This prediction was soon to be proven correct. The day after Gladstone’s
resignation, led by Benjamin Lucraft,106 10,000 people gathered in Trafalgar Square, to
calls of “Gladstone and Liberty” and denunciations of the Tories. The crowd then
marched to Gladstone’s house and, finding him not home, cheered his wife. They ended
the evening by heckling the Conservative Carlton Club.107 This, said The Beehive, gave
the lie to assertions that the working classes were indifferent to Reform: “The lies and
calumnies that have been heaped upon them in Parliament . . . have aroused them from
their temporary apathy”. The “noble and chivalrous defence of those classes by Mr.
Gladstone . . . have spurred them into vigorous action, and have evoked such a spirit in
them that will not again be quieted without their being placed in possession of those
political rights so long and unjustly withheld.”108 With Gladstone’s bill defeated, advised
Frederic Harrison, the Reformers were now free to demand radical Reform. “We now
know”, he said, “that the extension of power to the working classes must be wrung from
those who have it”. This was, he said, “the last chance of . . . a moderate measure.
Compromise . . . is now over.”109
The defeat of Gladstone’s bill coincided with a period of economic hardship for
the working classes. A financial panic in May had affected the rest of the economy and
caused widespread unemployment. At the same time, the price of food rose significantly
due to poor crops. The result was significant hardship among both unskilled and skilled
labor. It seems likely that this contributed to the combative mood among the English
working classes.110
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A larger demonstration on 2 July brought some 60,000-80,000 people to Trafalgar
Square, where Beales and other speakers denounced Lowe, praised Gladstone and Bright,
and insisted that a much larger extension than that in the defeated bill would now be
demanded.111 Later that week, the Reform League decided to hold a demonstration of up
to 100,000 individuals in Hyde Park later that month.112 This alarmed the authorities, and
five days before the demonstration was to be held, Sir Richard Mayne, the Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police, notified Beales that the meeting was not to be permitted.
Beales replied that he had no legal right to infringe upon the rights of public meeting in
such a way.113 After much discussion the Reform League chose to defend the rights of
public meeting and go ahead with the demonstration.114
As planned, a large procession of working men, led by Beales, marched to Hyde
Park on the evening of the 23 July 1866. They were met by 1,600-1,800 policemen who
had barred the gates. A large crowd had already gathered on the scene.115 Beales
demanded entry to the park, and was refused by the police, who tore Beales’s coat in the
ensuing scuffle. Beales then gave up and tried to lead the crowd on to Trafalgar Square
as planned. About 15,000 of the demonstrators followed him.116 The rest, perhaps
numbering 50,000-100,000, quickly became embroiled in a riot.117 Accounts differ as to
how it started. Some simply state that the crowd forced their way into the park, pulling
down the rusty, flimsy railings that surrounded it.118 The labor papers insisted that at first,
111
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the railings were pushed in accidentally by the pressure of the crowd. It was only after the
police responded by attacking the involuntary infiltrators with truncheons that the
angered crowd, crying “Down with the railings!”, proceeded to assault the rest of the park
fences as well as the police.119 At any rate, the railings fell in places all around the park,
and the outnumbered police proved totally unable to prevent the crowd from entering, in
spite of the extensive use of their clubs. An extended brawl ensued as members of the
crowd fought the police with sticks and paving stones, resulting in serious injuries on
both sides. Soldiers were sent in to assist the police, but London’s West End remained in
turmoil for the rest of the day.120 While this was going on, members of the League and
L.W.M.A., led by Baxter Langley and William Cremer,121 were able to hold a meeting
inside the park, speaking to several thousand onlookers.122 Langley praised the crowd for
defending their rights, and after the meeting the speakers led a procession of perhaps
20,000 to Trafalgar Square.123 Other individuals held impromptu meetings elsewhere in
the park,124 including a female radical who spoke for three hours on Reform, being
“carried in triumph from place to place” by the crowd.125 Others expressed their opinions
by smashing Lord Elcho’s window panes.126 The disturbances continued the next day, as
the police again failed to clear the park or restore order.127
A deputation from the League met with the Home secretary, Spencer Walpole,
and offered to restore order on condition that he withdraw the police and troops.128
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Walpole, becoming “overcome almost to tears, or quite to tears”, accepted the offer.129
The next day, with a largely peaceful crowd of 40,000-50,000 people present, the leaders
of the League delivered an address and asked those present to disperse peacefully.130
Beales congratulated those present for their “great and glorious victory”. A large portion
of the crowd followed Beales out of the park, with most of the rest departing soon
afterwards.131 Beales later credited this agreement with Walpole with averting “the
imminent certainty, of a struggle, which might have been both general and sanguinary,
not only in the park, but throughout the metropolis”.132 It is an indication of impression
created by the riots, that an international revolutionary would approach Odger and
Cremer with plans for an armed insurrection, which however met with instant
rejection.133
The riots created a great deal of unease among the upper and middle classes. The
Times denounced the “dangerous riot”, denigrated its participants as a “mass of the
coarsest mob”, and accused the Reform League of desiring to “make a display of
numbers which should overawe the legislature . . . and . . . the ‘ruling classes’”.134 “The
result”, it was lamented, “has gone beyond our apprehensions. The disorderly element in
the crowd has been more lawless and more wantonly destructive than we could have
expected”.135 One commentator lamented the debacle of “our authorities derided, our
public force defeated, and our metropolis given up for some hours to the brutal violence
of an infuriated mob.”136
The Conservative Morning Post worriedly declared it “revolutionary”, while
Bright’s Morning Star lauded it as “an uprising of the people in their might”.137 The
Saturday Review called it “a more serious attempt at rioting than has occurred in London
since the days which survive only in the fading memory of the contemporaries of
BURDETT and Orator HUNT”. It accused the League of attempting to terrorize
parliament, and emphasized the importance of preventing “the dangerous classes from
combining to exert their strength”. It warned that “it is not clear that London might not . .
129
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. be half ruined by a coup de main on the part of those who have everything to gain, and
nothing to lose, by a combined attack on property and peace”.138 It lamented that “a blow
has been struck not only at the exercise, but even at the principle of authority in England,
which cannot but shake . . . her influence in every nation of Europe. For the past week
London has virtually been in the hands of the dregs of its population.”139 Noting the
alarm of the middle class, it said that “it was high time to be frightened”. It claimed that
only the willingness of the middle class to defend itself by force had prevented the riots
from going further.140
Thinking that Walpole had assented, the League planned another meeting in Hyde
Park, but Walpole denied having given any permission. Many of the Leaguers wanted
the meeting anyway, but J.S. Mill dissuaded them, warning them that it would cause a
collision with the military. They should only do so, he said, if they wanted a revolution
and thought they could accomplish one.141 Instead, the League chose to hold an indoor
meeting at the Agricultural Hall in Islington. The meeting was enthusiastic and was
considered a great success. The hall was crammed with 25,000 individuals, and the major
streets outside were blocked for a considerable distance by the thousands unable to fit in
the hall. There was a certain glee evident at the impression the Reform movement was
creating. Beales, calling the meeting proof that the working man was no longer
indifferent to Reform, declared the week one of “much honour and of much triumph for
the people” and joked about the fall of the railings. One speaker went so far as to
“rejoice” that they were pulled down. The repressiveness of the government and the
brutality of the police were roundly denounced. Two Radical MPs, P.A. Taylor and J.S.
Mill, spoke briefly, and the latter was given a petition to present to parliament, criticizing
the closure of Hyde Park and the “acts of gross and savage violence” by the police. On
the same day, 10-12,000 working men, unconnected to the League, held a meeting in
Victoria Park. One speaker there said that “if the Government had been the most ardent
friends of Reform instead of its bitter enemies, they could not have adopted a line of
conduct more favourable to the cause than that which they had taken.”
Another meeting the next day by the Potter’s L.W.M.A. drew 12,000 men. There
were meetings throughout the country, including one in Bristol with 15,000
participants,142 and one in Sheffield not long after with 20,000.143 One labor
commentator noted that the events of the past several weeks had caused the working
classes to shake off their apathy on Reform. The working-class enthusiasm for Reform
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had been ignited by the insults of Lowe and other parliamentarians and had been fanned
by the despotism of the government and the brutality of the police with respect to Hyde
Park, creating “such a feeling amongst the people” that only the moderation of the
Reform leadership “saved the metropolis from riot and bloodshed, and the country
possibly from a revolution”.144 While this was perhaps something of an exaggeration, it is
indicative of the prevailing mood. E.S. Beesly argued that, in the wake of Hyde Park, the
movement had become a struggle not just for the right to vote, but for the political
freedoms of the working class in general. The ruling classes, he said, seemed ready to
stifle the rights of public meeting and use coercion against political opposition, and he
urged the working class to defend their freedoms.145
The Reform demonstrations that followed were some of the largest the country
had seen in years. Those in the northern industrial cities seem to have been particularly
massive. The first of these took place in Birmingham on 27 August 1866. For the first
time, trade unions took a direct part in the demonstration. The trades of Birmingham and
surrounding towns joined in procession alongside the local friendly and temperance
societies. The local middle-class Liberals assisted, local employers letting their
employees leave early to take part. Bright took part, as did the mayor. The demonstration
was compared to the Birmingham demonstration of 1831 that had helped force the 1832
Reform Act. The participants were said to have numbered between 200,000 and
250,000.146 Beales, echoing Gladstone, declared that “every man who was morally and
intellectually qualified was entitled to vote”, and called it unjust that working men who
paid taxes had no voice in how they were spent. There could not be equality of property,
but “equality of political and civil rights there could be [and] ought to be”. Potter spoke at
the meeting, calling on the people of England to agitate through the winter, to “let the
people raise their sovereign voice and tell the opponents of reform and the opponents of
the extension of their liberties that England was determined that her people should be
enfranchised”. “Victory”, he said, “would now assuredly be with the people.”147 Bright
seemed inclined to ride the wave of popular enthusiasm. Speaking afterwards, he hailed
the fact that the largest assemblies in a generation were gathering in favor of Reform, and
declared that he had “no fear of manhood suffrage” or the ballot.148
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According to one commentator, the lull in the Reform movement, which had
characterized the past few years, was now past. “That time”, he lamented, “was allowed
to slip away, to the regret of many advocates of moderate progress, and now the demands
of the unenfranchised are increasing in proportion to the delay”. He advised the middle
and upper classes that “by timely concessions they my lead a willing people; by
endeavouring to monopolise power, they will lose their own position.”149
The Reform League grew at an impressive rate. In September, a Northern
Department of the League was created, headquartered in Manchester, and a Scottish
Reform League was formed soon afterwards. Manchester held the next large
demonstration, on 24 September.150 It was a joint demonstration of the Reform Union and
the Reform League, and 200,000 individuals took part.151 Nearly 30,000 met in Liverpool
in the same week.152 This was followed on 8 October by a massive demonstration at
Leeds. In this case the middle class was not as encouraging as at the Manchester and
Birmingham demonstrations- the railway companies refused to provide excursion trains,
and employers threatened to dismiss employees who participated.153 In spite of this, the
demonstration was attended by some 200,000-300,000 people, of which about 70,000
marched in a 4-5 mile long procession.154
A demonstration by the Scotch Reform League in Glasgow on 16 October
brought about 150,000 people, double the number that had appeared there in 1832. The
trades procession stretched over four miles long. It included “nearly every branch of
manufacturing industry carried on in Glasgow” and was said to number about 30,000
people.155 In addition to these especially large gatherings, there were numerous smaller
demonstrations throughout the country that are too numerous to list. For example, one
week in October saw four demonstrations with between 5,000 and 10,000 participants.156
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Each of these demonstrations followed much the same pattern, with a procession, a huge
outdoor rally with multiple speaking platforms usually featuring Beales, Potter and
others, followed by an indoor meeting in which Bright was usually the lead speaker.
Bright’s speeches were filled with fiery populist invective, primarily against the
aristocracy. He decried the fact that “the aristocracy of land and wealth usurp the power
in both Houses of Parliament”, and that the Lords effectively controlled half of the
Commons. If the country had been better governed, and land had not been monopolized
by a small class, there would have been fewer wars, lighter taxes, better education, freer
trade, and a much larger middle class. He called the demonstrations “an exhibition of
force of opinion now, and if that force of opinion be threatened, it may become an
exhibition of another kind of force.”157 Many Liberals were appalled by his speeches,158
and Gladstone privately remarked that he did not like what he saw of them.159
Not everyone in the League was happy with Bright, and some attempted to split
with him and the middle-class Reformers over their unwillingness to back manhood
suffrage. He was defended by Odger and Peter Henriette, who viewed him as
indispensable. Beales offered Bright leadership of the League if he would support
manhood suffrage.160
Meanwhile, Potter and his London Working Men’s Association had been at work
persuading the trade unions of London to stage their own Reform demonstration. In
October he invited all the trade societies of London to discuss holding such a
demonstration. A large number of the trades responded positively, and a demonstration
was set to take place on 3 December.161 Several of the large trade unions, however,
would not participate, possibly because of the feud between Potter and the Junta.162
Those trades that were involved had about 100,000 members163, 70,000 of whom
purchased tickets to march in the procession.164 The trades, mainly of skilled artisans,
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were eager to leave a good impression, and hence the procession was to be exclusively of
union members rather than the general populace.165 When none of the city parks were
made available for a demonstration, the organizers avoided a confrontation by contenting
themselves with the smaller private grounds of Lord Ranelagh.166 Many large employers
threatened to fire any employee who took part in the demonstration.167 Some viewed the
demonstration with great apprehension; one weekly complained that “the gentlemen
whose logic is only the terrorism of numbers” have organized “a monster procession” to
“take possession of London”.168
The day of the procession turned out to be frigid and rainy, the roads being filled
with several inches of slush and mud. The procession, consisting of between 25,000 and
35,000 working men from nearly fifty trades, wound its way through the London
streets.169 A vast crowd of half a million lined the route as it walked past.170 The
procession was smaller than expected, but the fact that such a large number of working
men would miss a day’s pay and risk employee reprisals, and tramp for miles through the
freezing slush and mud in order to demand the vote, was considered an impressive
achievement.171
The Times, while noting what it considered to be lower than expected turnout,
described the participants in uncharacteristically friendly tones: “any Englishman might
feel proud of their bearing and demeanor”, braving the elements to “vindicate a principle
on which they felt strongly”. It declared the demonstration “amply sufficient to show that
a large portion of the artisan class desire the franchise, and that there is no reason to
believe they will abuse it.”172 Lord Lennox, whom Disraeli had instructed to mingle with
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the crowds, reported that it was “certainly a formidable demonstration”, concluding that
“the drilling and organization . . . have been a complete success.”173
The involvement of trade unions in the Reform movement only increased as it
progressed. The London Trades Council, some of whose members already had a
prominent role in the Reform League, now took a direct part in the agitations. William
Allan, supported by Applegarth, George Edgar, and Edwin Coulson, declared the
Council’s adhesion to the principles of the Reform League, and declared it an absolute
necessity that all trade unionists of Britain and Ireland join in assisting the agitations for
the franchise.174 The Council also pledged itself to support a demonstration on 11
February, to coincide with the opening of the next session of parliament.175
The role of trade unions in the agitations had already been impressive, but several
factors served both to increase their participation in those agitations and add to the
atmosphere of increasing tension that was developing in early 1867. The trade unions
found themselves increasingly threatened. The behavior of a few small unions in
Sheffield, who used violence and threats against workmen who failed to contribute funds
or follow union rules, had become widely publicized. These “Sheffield outrages”
attained national notoriety, and in spite of their being denounced by the other unions, they
caused a reaction against trade unions in general. In February 1867, it was announced
that a Royal Commission of Inquiry would be created to investigate not only criminal
behavior by unions, but the effects of trade unionism in general.176
A further threat to the trade unions came from a crushing legal defeat handed
down by the Court of Queen’s Bench in the case of Hornby vs. Close. A union had
attempted to sue one of its treasurers, but the court had ruled that it had no right to do so.
Unions, it ruled, were illegal organizations in restraint of trade, and hence had no right to
legal protection. They now had no legal recourse to prevent their funds from being
embezzled.177 The Beehive commented, “Every day proves more and more the absolute
necessity there is for trades’ unions, if they desire to exist much longer, taking a stronger
and sterner part in obtaining a radical Parliamentary reform . . . Trades’ unions exist now
but on sufferance.”178 Thus, as 1867 began, the trade unions were feeling both
encouraged on the issue of Reform, and increasingly threatened on issues crucial to their
survival.
The prominence of the trade unionists in the Reform movement added to the
unease of the wealthier classes. The Times found the alliance between “extreme
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Reformers and the Trades’ Unions” to be an “ominous threat”.179 It harshly criticized
Bright for allying with them, fearing that they might “acquire political strength, and
become the masters alike of men and capital”.180 Blackwood’s deplored the
transformation of trade unions into “a political party in the State”; it was this that made
the Reform League truly dangerous.181
As might be expected, such an impressive array of demonstrations had a very
significant impact on the national political debate. As one sympathetic commentator put
it, “that puzzle . . . which in August so greatly perplexed the House, whether workmen do
or do not desire to enter the Constitution, will be found to have become clear [during the
recess] . . . the workmen do care, care so much that their foes have changed their tone,
and instead of charging them with indifference, accuse them of revolutionary fervor and
oppressiveness”. Delay was impossible: “if the kettle is not taken off the fire, the water
will express its own opinion by coming out of the spout”. Most of the constituents, while
not earnest about the matter, were inclined to support Reform, while the leftmost 20
percent of them would punish any hesitancy. If a dissolution were to take place, the
Radicals would gain significantly.182 The Times agreed that a dissolution would lead to a
parliament “deeper pledged than ever to Reform”.183
Another writer, analyzing the “curious process” by which “the extension of our
franchise has come to be accepted as one of the necessities of the day”, noted that “the
demand for reform is more deeply rooted than was at first hastily supposed . . . the battle
is now in earnest”.184 Another said, “the apathy [on Reform] for which the mass of the
nation was formerly mocked has given place to an excitement far too intense to be
allayed by palliatives”. Although deploring the vehement language of the demonstrations,
it saw them as an understandable reaction: “The agitation that now convulses England . . .
are the legitimate fruits of the conduct and speeches in which the dominant class has
indulged.”185 It continued, “the country is thoroughly aroused; procrastination has ceased
to be a possible policy. . . it is the unanimous opinion of the thinking public that reform
must be immediate and thorough”.186 It regretted that popular demonstrations had been
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necessary to make reform inevitable, and warned of their dangers: “those who take part in
these demonstrations are on our side today, but they may use the same means to attain
ends which would be obnoxious to every far-seeing Liberal”.187
Another, while criticizing the “violent” language of Beales and Potter, called the
demonstrations “a noble display by the workmen of England”, and said that “the
argument can never be again used that the working classes do not care about Reform”.188
Fraser’s argued against any attempt at delaying Reform, as it would only intensify the
agitations: “If there was a fair chance of these demonstrations dying out, then . . . we
might venture to wait; but there would be small prudence in provoking another year of
them, at the obvious risk of their becoming more threatening in demeanor and more
peremptory in tone”.189 The old Whig quarterly Edinburgh Review felt that the
“circumstances attending the demonstrations . . . should suffice to convince all thinking
men” that it would be desirable to settle the Reform question, although it was also
determined not to be threatened by “Chartists” or “mobs”.190
The Times was of the opinion that “if the House of Commons could have the
needful protection, and did not consist of gentlemen bound to tell how they vote, it would
probably shelve the subject very soon”. It felt that, however, “delays are now dangerous .
. . because the mischiefs of the movement are growing . . . They may not form a very
serious danger, but they prove the turn things are taking while we put off the question, the
palpable rights of which press for an early settlement. It is the middle class . . . that is
menaced by these delays and by the agitations they keep up.”191
Gladstone was both impressed and concerned: “The reform movement is by
degrees complicating the question . . . it may become too strong for us; or at least too
strong to be stayed with our bill of last year. I do not envy Lord Derby and his friends.”192
Samuel Laing, a Liberal who during the spring had argued, to Conservative cheers, that it
would be dangerous to lower the franchise, now attempted to tell his constituents that he
had wanted “not to defeat Reform, but to enlarge it”. Unsurprisingly, he was attacked for
his glaring inconsistency.193
In spite of the fact that the demonstrations had been, aside from Hyde Park,
overwhelmingly peaceful, Conservative commentators tended to see the agitations in a
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highly threatening light. In Blackwood’s, the same commentator who had earlier praised
the words of Robert Lowe and found the working classes unfit for the vote, had by
December considerably changed his tone. About the demonstrations, he said, “far be it
from us to underrate their importance or their significancy . . . [they] speak to us of
power, moral as well as physical”. Before, the author had opposed a Reform bill. But
recently, ”matters have a great deal changed their aspect. The feelings of the multitude
are easily worked upon by such eloquence as has of late been addressed to them”. While
some of the working men might perceive that what they were told was false, “still a
residue abides of power enough to stir them into that state of dogged determination that
leads to violence.” If it were to be a choice between making concessions to the
agitations, and putting them down by force, the former was to be preferred: “Let us not be
misunderstood. With Parliamentary Reform, Derby . . . must deal, and deal decisively”.
Delay on the issue was considered preferable, but not necessarily possible.194
By contrast, the Quarterly Review was opposed to concessions. It decried the
“designing demagogues” who had incited multitudes to coerce parliament, and looked
with dread at the “menacing exhibitions of force” that would try to scare it into “an
ignoble concession” if it refused to meet the Reformers demands. But if the demands
were submitted to, the results would be the dominance of the poor over the rich, and the
supremacy of trade unions.195 It hoped that Bright and his friends would flinch from
violence. “May we never see such a collision as the mob-leaders are labouring to bring
about! If it be forced upon us, the country will recollect who began it, and why its
authors were punished”.196
To another commentator, the situation presented opportunities for Disraeli to
champion a Reform bill. While the moderate Liberals, alienated by Bright, might accept a
bill from the Conservatives, the Conservatives might be frightened enough by the
agitations to allow Disraeli to create one. “Notwithstanding”, he said, “the total absence
of argument, and the contemptible character of all but one of the traveling agitators, the
demand of many thousands of artisans for revolutionary change cannot be regarded as
wholly insignificant . . . Conservative obstinacy may be pliable under the menace of
revolutionary disturbance.”197
The Conservative government had also been affected by the agitations. The
change came slowly. In September, Lord Derby had written Disraeli that he was
“reluctantly coming to the conclusion that we shall have to deal with the question of
Reform”, but Disraeli had remained unconvinced.198 A major push came from the
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Queen. She became greatly concerned about the agitations, and on 28 October, her views
were made known to Lord Derby. She had become “convinced that, if the question of
Reform be not taken up in earnest by her Ministers, with a view to its settlement, very
serious consequences may ensue”. She offered to appeal to Gladstone and Russell to meet
with the government, to settle a question that, “while it continues to be made a subject of
agitation, must act injuriously upon the best interests of the country, and may even
threaten the disturbance of its peace and tranquility”.199 At his next cabinet meeting,
Derby brought the question under consideration, and the ministers unanimously decided
that the problem “could not be ignored, but must be resolutely grappled with.200
Disraeli initially wanted to delay acting on the issue, and toyed with the idea of
setting up a Royal Commission to deal with the question. As he told Lord Cranborne,
“The Whigs are very unanimous in wishing the question ‘settled’- but you and I are not
Whigs”.201 However, by January Disraeli began to conclude that it would be best to deal
with the question immediately. He wrote to Derby on 3 January 1867 that they must
come to a decision on how to proceed with Reform. “Otherwise”, he said, “I see anarchy
ahead. There are many other great matters pressing, but this is paramount.”202 Later, in a
conversation with Bright, Disraeli acknowledged the effect of the agitations: “The
working-class question was the real question, and that was the thing that demanded to be
settled”.203
Many other Conservatives seem to have come to similar conclusions. One
Liverpool Tory told Disraeli that there was “only one opinion out of doors: settlement of
the question.”204 One of his ministers opined that “men . . . are really anxious for a
popular measure and early legislation . . . others who . . . would gladly see it postponed,
may nevertheless be apprehensive of the consequences of another year of agitation, and
may wish the question settled”.205 Another Conservative said that, while he did not want
Reform, he “would much rather see a moderate Bill from our Side than an immoderate
one from Gladstone, Bright & Co. [It was] better . . . to be wise in time, and do with a
good grace what will have to be submitted to.”206
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The general feeling seems to have been that Reform was now inevitable. If the
Conservative government did nothing, not only was there the danger of unfortunate
unrest, but the likelihood that Gladstone would replace Derby and Disraeli and enact
something more damaging to the Conservatives. One commentator feared that if the
Conservative government fell, Gladstone would inevitably head the Liberals, and being
dependent on Bright and the Reform League for support, would enact a dangerously
radical Reform bill. Perhaps the Conservatives and Adullamites could prevent Reform in
parliament, but this would most unwise: “To postpone legislation . . . on the subject of
Parliamentary Reform, would be tantamount to challenging the masses to do their worst;
and although we entertain no doubts respecting the results of a collision . . . there is
nothing we would more deprecate”.207
According to one commentator, a radical Reform bill was now necessary: “Events
have greatly changed the position of things . . . to bring in a small bill now is quite
useless . . . it will seem to be passed by those who hate it, in the sole hope of staving off a
greater measure . . . it therefore cannot earn gratitude, give satisfaction, or still the effort
for a greater change”. If, as seemed likely, adequate Reform were opposed, it would
result in “a deep and perhaps incurable schism [between classes], in which aristocratical
influence must ever sink, and real democracy will loom in the distance”.208
As Lord Cranborne later put it, “there can be no doubt that . . . the one dominant
feeling of the present year has been a feverish anxiety to ‘settle the question’ . . . the
meetings in the manufacturing towns, and the riots in Hyde Park, had had their effect.”209
Thus, by early 1867, it was widely believed among both Liberals and Conservatives that
the Reform issue could no longer be avoided, but had to be solved, and soon. This was in
no small part due to the impression made by the agitations. The political actions that
resulted in the Reform Act of 1867 are best understood in this context.
The Conservative government’s path to a Reform bill proved to be a rocky one.
The day parliament opened, on 11 February, it was met by another demonstration. It
included a procession 25,000 strong and huge masses of spectators, believed to be three
times as numerous as those on 3 December.210 The government proposed a set of
resolutions on the possible shape of a reform bill, but they were criticized as vague and
were largely a failure in the House.211 One commentator harshly criticized the ministry
for attempting a delaying tactic: “Surely they should have seen that it was neither
honourable nor safe to trifle with the country in this matter: that there never was a period
when national confidence in public men was more needed to check the menacing
progress of popular discontent.” If nothing were accomplished, “we want no prophet to
207
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foretell that Mr. Bright’s next autumn campaign will be more successful than his last, or
that Mr. Beales and the Reform League will be looking up”.212
Three days later, Disraeli abruptly announced he would create a bill a soon as
possible.213 Disraeli favored a measure of household suffrage, hedged by limitations to
prevent working-class numerical dominance. He had difficulty with some of the
ministers, however, who found even restricted household suffrage unpalatable.214 One
was described as “very placable, except on the phrase ‘household suffrage’, when his eye
lights up with insanity”.215 In order to keep them on board, Disraeli was forced to
propose a limited measure, called the “Ten Minutes Bill” because it was only decided
upon ten minutes before it was read to the house.216
The Conservative ministry’s stumbling took place within an atmosphere of
continuing tension. It was, said one Liberal commentator, “a very severe and perilous
crisis”, which in other countries might mean revolution. One side was bent on being
admitted to power, while the other was only half committed to conceding it. The
demonstrations might be moderate now, but if the political class fails to resolve the issue,
then the “demonstrations will assume very different proportions, and the demands of
which they are the expression grow to very different dimensions from those which they
have at present”. The only thing that kept the ministry in its place was “the realized
conviction that the situation is critical”.217 Blackwood’s was even more concerned. “Not
within the memory of living men”, he said, “nor long before it, has England stood in a
position of greater danger or difficulty than that in which she stands at this moment”. A
weak government and a divided opposition, threatened and libeled by well-organized
groups out of doors; a large portion of the working class misled by demagogues: It all
added up to the danger of revolution.218 Frederic Harrison pessimistically predicted that
“Reform Bills and Reform agitations will go on now for many a long year”. He predicted
that “the contest is undoubtedly deepening; it may possibly be acute—it will probably be
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protracted”. If the upper classes would reform the constitution, they could avoid
subjection by the working men, but “if not— then not”.219
The League was suspicious of the actions of the Conservative government. The
ten minutes bill was called “an insult to the working classes”, and it was feared that there
would be “‘a nice little arrangement’ for admitting as few as possible”. Suspicion
extended to both parties: It was not merely the Tories that they had to fight against, but
the House itself. At the behest of Lucraft, the League decided to hold weekly meetings in
Trafalgar Square, and they discussed holding a meeting in Hyde Park, the scene of the
previous year’s riots. Cremer suggested they “consider the propriety of . . . a universal
cession from labor until their political rights are conceded”.220 Potter soon afterwards
made a similar proposal, of “a week’s cessation from business”,221 a suggestion that sent
one Liberal MP into transits of anxiety over the possible damage to the economy.222
Potter’s language was heated: “If the Tory government continued their opposition, they
would incur results which they did not then anticipate, but for which they would be held
responsible. I do not advocate physical force; but . . . sacrifices [had] been made without
their demands being conceded. This could not be continued without sad results.”223
The ten minutes bill was regarded as a failure. A meeting of 150 Conservative
backbenchers urged the government to go back to its earlier plan of household suffrage
with safeguards. They believed that the ten minutes bill “was not equal to the occasion”;
it was strongly felt that “the question must be settled”.224 On 2 March Derby and Disraeli
reverted to the plan of household suffrage. Lord Cranborne, Lord Carnarvon and General
Peel promptly resigned from the cabinet in protest.225 Potter viewed these developments
as encouraging: “If rumour be relied upon, the Tories are actually going to outbid the
Whigs upon Reform”. However, he had little faith in either faction. Both parties must be
watched carefully or the working class would be “humbugged and betrayed”.226
Disraeli introduced his new bill, based upon household suffrage, on 18 March
1867. In his speech to parliament, he said that it put the franchise on “a broad popular
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basis”, establishing new “popular privileges” while avoiding democracy.227 The bill
would give all householders in the boroughs the ability to vote, provided that, as a test of
“regularity of life and general trustworthiness of conduct”, they paid their poor rates
personally and could prove two years residency. The bill, he stated, would immediately
enfranchise 237,000 working-class borough voters. There remained 486,000
householders who would not automatically qualify because, due to local law, they paid
their rates through their landlord rather than personally. These “compound householders”
would be allowed to vote by opting out of the Act and paying their rates personally.
Those who felt that they would not go through the mild inconvenience, Disraeli argued,
were underestimating the working man’s desire for the vote.228 To compensate for the
new working-class voters, Disraeli proposed a series of “fancy franchises”, which granted
the vote to individuals who met requirements based on education, direct taxation, or bank
deposits. Individuals meeting these qualifications, who already possessed the vote, were
to be granted an extra vote. Altogether, this would add 305,000 votes, mainly for the
more affluent.229
The bill had the superficial appearance of being a grand concession to the
working class, but its actual effect promised to be much more limited. The requirement
for two years residency excluded many working men, who often had to move frequently
for employment reasons.230 The requirement for personal rate-payment effectively
excluded even more. While Disraeli did allow the compound householders to opt out of
compounding, this would be a highly inconvenient process and would result in them
paying higher rates.231 Disraeli privately told another Conservative that probably only
115,000 working men would actually obtain the vote immediately, while no more than
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50,000 compound householders would likely take the trouble to be added. The bill,
Disraeli assured him, was a conservative one, and had “really no spice of democracy”.232
The measure appeared messier and more unfair the more closely it was examined.
It was the local parish that determined whether or not the local tenants were
compounders. Thus, in some districts, Disraeli’s bill would result in immediate
household suffrage, while in others, very few would in practical terms be able to vote.
Local officials could exploit this fact to arbitrarily alter the number of local voters. 233
Compound householders tended to be disproportionately from the larger urban boroughs,
where the literate, politically aware, unionized artisans were more prevalent.234
The working-class Reformers reacted skeptically to Disraeli’s bill. Although the
household suffrage provision was viewed positively, the bill as a whole was seen as a
“confused, deceptive, and contradictory measure”.235 In the words of one Rochdale
working man, it was a bill “full of trickery, and nothing but a sham to deceive working
men”.236 Potter described it as a “gigantic fraud” and “an errant piece of political trickery
intended to deceive”.237 Another called it “a remarkable display of clever Tory
claptrap”.238 To Beales, the acceptance of the principle of household suffrage was
considered a step forward; if the dishonest limitations on it were thrown away, and it
were combined with a franchise for lodgers, it would be a considerable step in the
direction of residential manhood suffrage. However, the effective disfranchisement of the
compound householders, as well as the fancy franchises and dual votes, were
unacceptable, and the agitations should continue until these were swept away. If Disraeli
would not do it, he must give way to someone who would.239
On 7 April, a Reform League deputation met with Disraeli to discuss their
difficulties with his bill and ask for a compromise. Although their ultimate goal
remained manhood suffrage, they were willing to accept authentic household suffrage
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combined with a lodger franchise, and they concentrated on criticizing those parts of the
Tory bill that stood in the way of such a measure. George Mantle240 said that they could
not support the bill as it stood, because “while in principle it professed to give deserving
citizens the franchise, in its details it rendered it almost impossible for them to avail
themselves of the right accorded them.” They declared the limitations on the compound
householder unacceptable, denounced the fancy franchises and the two-year residency
requirement, and requested a lodger franchise. Disraeli urged the need for compromise
and insisted that his bill was based on “very popular principles”. The Leaguers
vigorously disagreed, and became “rather free and easy in their manner”.241 Beales
complained that nothing from the deputation was “calculated to save the Reform League
from further labour and agitation”. Fearing that the House would compromise on a
modest measure, he argued that there should be “no more trifling” until an honest
measure was produced.242
Gladstone wanted the Conservative bill utterly transformed in committee, in order
to produce “a liberal enfranchisement . . . and thus put an end to the agitation of the
question”.243 Most of his proposed alterations were in accord with what the workingclass Reformers wanted: Removal of the restrictions on the compound householder, a
franchise for lodgers, abolition of the dual vote and fancy franchises, and reduction of the
residency requirement. If these were conceded, said The Beehive, the result would be a
bill that “the country can accept with honour”.244 But in place of household suffrage,
Gladstone supported a lower limit of £5 rating on the borough suffrage.245 As Gladstone
put it, “if Parliament wants to limit the franchise, let it limit the franchise openly and
manfully. Let it not send forth a two-faced bill, with a face of Toryism on one side and a
face of democracy on the other”.246
The Liberals in general were not happy with Disraeli’s bill, for a variety of
reasons. Not only did its unfair restrictions seem certain to provoke further agitation, but
if the restrictions were removed, it would go farther than many wanted to go, and many
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Liberal manufacturers, it was said, did not wish to be “too completely at the mercy of the
employed”.247 Bright supported Gladstone’s actions, ostensibly for pragmatic reasons,248
and seemingly vacillated between calling true household suffrage the “most solid and
ancient basis” for the franchise, and expressing a desire for the exclusion of the
“residuum”, “a small class at the very bottom of the scale”, consisting of persons of
“almost hopeless poverty and dependence”.249
The working-class Reformers were disappointed with Gladstone. The Beehive
lamented that Gladstone’s £5 line “falls short of that which, in the public mind, is rapidly
rising up to the dimensions of a sine qua non”.250 Privately, Howell noted to Beales,
“Gladstone seems trimming. We must keep him up to the mark”.251 Others were more
outspoken. Benjamin Lucraft called the £5 line was “as reprehensible as the Tory dodge”
and said that it “ought not to satisfy the people”. He argued that “Whigs and Tories
should be equally regarded with distrust”.252 There was, however, an inclination to give
Gladstone the benefit of the doubt, out of a “full belief in his honesty”253 and a desire to
take control of the Reform question away from the untrustworthy Tories.254
Gladstone, however, proved no more successful at controlling the Liberals than he
had the previous year. Some Radicals, believing that Disraeli’s bill could be modified
into real household suffrage, refused to cooperate on establishing Gladstone’s £5 line.
Disraeli, said a Liberal commentator, pursued a double-faced course, reassuring the
Conservatives with restrictions while vaguely encouraging the Radicals to think that
these restrictions could be removed: “Conservatives who support Disraeli, support him
because they think he offers to exclude more than Mr. Gladstone; the Radicals who
support him, support him because his proposed barriers will be far easier to throw down
than Mr. Gladstone’s”.255
There was also an a fear that Gladstone would bring down the Conservative
ministry, and an anxious desire for a rapid resolution of the controversy. The question,
said one Radical dissident, must be settled before “a catastrophe or revolution occurred”,
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destroying the chance for moderate change.256 One Liberal commentator viewed the
possible downfall of the government, and the resulting dissolution of parliament, as a
potential disaster. The electors would be “subjected to a reign of terror, by the inflaming
of the temper of the masses to fever heat . . . the multitude would openly avow the policy
of terrifying them into compliance”.257
On the other hand, Disraeli was largely successful in keeping the Conservative
rank-and-file on his side. A speech by an East Cornwall Tory squire perhaps indicates
some reasons for this. In the past, he said, he had been hard set against Reform, and had
even opposed Disraeli’s 1859 bill. But now, thanks to Gladstone’s bill, the Reform
League, and Hyde Park, “a new state of circumstances had arisen, and he found himself
placed in a situation of some embarrassment”. Many “hard-headed Conservatives” who
had opposed Reform before, now argued that, “as there was a deep-rooted feeling of
discontent planted in the minds of men, it was desirable that a large measure of Reform
should be introduced”, and he was inclined to find them persuasive. He blamed
Gladstone and Bright for provoking the agitations, but if the ministry felt it necessary to
make concessions, he felt that their plan provided as good a resting place as any.258
On 12 April Gladstone attempted to move an amendment that would abolish the
disabilities on the compound householder. It was believed that the amendment would be
followed with another that would establish a £5 line, as the only remaining way of
limiting the franchise. Disraeli portrayed the amendment as a “wrecking amendment”
and threatened to drop the bill and dissolve parliament if it were carried. The amendment
was defeated, with the assistance of former Adullamites and other Liberals, as well as a
small number of Radicals. Gladstone, in his diary, called it “a smash . . . perhaps without
example”.259
Beales argued that Gladstone had made a great mistake in advocating a £5
franchise, and said that “if Gladstone had taken up the position of insisting . . . upon a
household suffrage, pure and unlimited . . . he would have had to a large extent the mind
of the public with him”. He did not understand, however, why advanced Liberals should
have opposed an amendment that had no direct relation to the £5 line, and was inclined to
consider it treachery.260 The Beehive saw the amendment in the same light, as one
establishing real household suffrage, and now had little optimism that the bill could be
improved in committee. Fuming that “the House of Commons has proved itself rotten to
the core”, and that “the Liberal party have betrayed the people”, it argued that “renewed
agitation, on a more extensive scale than before, must now be the order of the day”.261
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While parliament wrangled over the bill, the Reform League and its allies
continued their demonstrations. A demonstration at Birmingham on 22 April featured a
procession by 40,000 local unionists and Leaguers and culminated in a meeting that
nearly filled a mile-long field with between 150,000 and 500,000 people. The meeting’s
resolutions featured stern language. The checks and restrictions in Disraeli’s bill were
called “an injustice and an insult to the people”. While the meeting wished to maintain
peace, law, and order, “the continued obstructions to reform, and the base treachery of the
House of Commons . . . will tend to exasperate a loyal and industrious people; and if
persevered in, may ultimately lead to anarchy and revolution”.262 The crowd is said to
have been less enthusiastic than usual at the mention of Gladstone, whose £5 line was not
popular.263 This was soon followed by another League demonstration at Leeds, in which
100,000 took part. Potter, Beales, and Ernest Jones264 were the leading speakers.
Resolutions were passed rejoicing at the progress that the principle of household suffrage
had made in parliament, and calling for all sincere reformers to oppose the restrictions
that prevented its full expression. Said one speaker, “The words household suffrage,
once uttered, however insincerely, by a political party, could not be recalled”. The
implication was that the nothing short of household suffrage would be accepted from
either party, and a Liberal MP who spoke in favor of the £5 line was booed by the
crowd.265
When it began to seem as if Disraeli’s bill might pass without sufficient alteration,
some Reformers began to advocate a more radical approach that put civil disobedience
and threats of force on the table. Even in the previous year, some had complained that the
movement had “slightly overdone ‘moral force’”, and argued for the value of threats.266
With the frustrations of March and April, the radical voices with in the League became
more vocal. At one tempestuous meeting, a League speaker said that the passage of
Disraeli’s bill “would be the signal for an agitation more extensive and embittered and
more powerful than had yet taken place”. Arguing that it would be time for stronger
measures than mere meetings and processions, he proposed that the working class refuse
to pay taxes. George Mantle denounced the bill as an “insult to the nation” and said that
parliament had forfeited the people’s respect. The English, he said, seeing “the flowers of
liberty growing up in every soil, watered by the blood of patriots and martyrs . . . had
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stuff enough in them to fight their own battle of liberty.” The people, he urged, must
make their voices heard, and make Parliament feel that they must concede to the working
classes or “for ever cease to exist”.267
There had for some time been discussion of a return to Hyde Park, the scene of
the previous year’s riots. At one point, a Reform League promenade through the park
had been planned, but Gladstone and Lord Shaftesbury had persuaded the League to
abandon the scheme.268 Now, however, there seems to have been a strong desire for a
showdown. Amid a tumultuous meeting, which became so heated that Beales at one point
threatened to leave, the League chose to hold a meeting at Hyde Park on 6 May. It was
felt that “the Reformers should show to the Government and their enemies in general that
they were no longer to be trifled with”.269 Odger, Cremer, and Lucraft backed the motion
against the wishes of the more moderate Beales and Howell.270
The radical language continued at the next council meeting. Charles Bradlaugh271
declared that the people were determined to refuse to pay taxes and rates if an honest
Reform measure were not passed. He said they would meet at Hyde Park whether the
Government attempted to stop it or not, and that they “would not only demand
admittance to the park, but enforce that admittance if refused”. Beales, the voice of
moderation, argued against strong language and said they must not assume the
government would interfere. The meeting resolved to hold the demonstration whether or
not the government attempted to prevent it.272 The Commonwealth was in a combative
mood: “Whoever lives to write the history of the Reform Movement of 1866-7 will, if we
mistake not, have the occasion to write the word blood ere he has concluded his task.
The people are in no mood to be trifled with.” The Reform leaders had tried hard to do
things peacefully, but they had received nothing but trickery from Disraeli. The working
class was unlikely to tolerate such treatment, and revolution was the probable outcome.
An alliance with Fenianism would be regrettable but not unlikely. “Let [the aristocracy]
be wise in time,” it warned, “for delays are more than dangerous”.273
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The government attempted to stop the demonstration, and on 1 May sent a
delegation of police officials to a meeting of the League council to announce that it
would not be permitted. Beales responded that the government had no legal right to do
so, and said that “if there were any riot or disturbance the fault would rest with the
government”. Bradlaugh was considerably more forceful. Prophesying that the
Government would call out the military, he said that he would not be deterred from
attending, and if violence were used he would be among the first to meet that violence.
The League council enthusiastically chose to go ahead with the meeting.274
The atmosphere preceding the meeting was tense. The Beehive, believing that the
government would attempt to arrest the speakers as they attempted to hold the meeting,
implored the demonstrators not to attempt a rescue, and “give an excuse to the
government for shedding the blood of the people”, of which “the consequences no one
can foretell, in the present temper of the working men”.275 The Commonwealth was
considerably less restrained. Of the government, it speculated, “Will it, dare it cause the
people to be slaughtered in cold blood?”. It warned: “Let but a single drop of blood shed
on Monday next, and, if we are not mistaken, the word will go forth, that such blood must
be avenged. We at least shall be prepared to admit that the reign of terror has
commenced and must be played out.”276 The Times, scolding the League for trying to
provoke a collision between the government and the crowd, predicted riots and
disturbance, and advised the curious to stay well away.277 In parliament, Gladstone
earnestly entreated the League to obey the government.278
Thousands of police, including much of the mounted constabulary, were to be
moved to the park. Thousands of special constables were sworn in and armed with
staves, and the military, planning to assist the police if needed, moved sizable
reinforcements to the capital. There was even a rumor that Armstrong guns would be
deployed. At the last minute, however, the government caved in and decided to let the
meeting take place.279 The park, lamented The Times, was “to be surrendered to King
Mob”. It continued: “It is now a comfort to think that we have reached . . . the very
bottom of this question, and cannot fall lower. MR. BEALES and his colleagues will
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reign in Hyde Park this evening, and may be considered the actual government of the
country . . . For our part, we must confess to a relief not of the most heroic kind”. If the
government had been implicated in bloodshed, it said, the Conservatives might have been
“ostracized from all power and place till the end of the century”.280
Although 10,000 police and soldiers were ready nearby in the event of any
disorder, the meeting that had “kept the metropolis in a state of chronic alarm and
agitation for the last month” took place without incident, and there appears to have been a
very large turnout.281 Probably between 150,000 and 200,000 attended.282 Beales
congratulated the crowd on their meeting, and told them that if they were firm and
resolved, they would “soon have the Reform they required”. Another called upon the
Commons to make the bill “a full and honest measure”. Bradlaugh reminded the crowd
of the Peterloo massacre, and explained that the “better educated classes” did not repeat it
this time “because they dared not, for there is now a power in the people, which would
strike the mightiest in the land”. Mantle, for his part, called for and received three cheers
for the Queen.283 The Beehive called it “a great moral victory” for the people,284 while
The Times called it “a humiliation on the government such as has seldom been suffered
by men in office.”285 The luckless Walpole, serving as a scapegoat, soon resigned as
Home Secretary.286 The demonstration attracted international admiration. Guiseppe
Garibaldi, the great Italian revolutionary, called it “the most important manifestation
which has for a long time conferred honour on the human family” and exhorted all who
could to “imitate . . . the glorious example of the people of England”.287
Bradlaugh’s National Reformer remarked that “to behold 200,000 working men
surrounding ten platforms for the purpose of denouncing the political manoeuvres and
unjust acts of the present government, should convince the most obstinate Tory that the
present so-called Reform Bill has but little chance of satisfying the just demands of the
280
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people”.288 Thus, the 6 May meeting demonstrated in unmistakable fashion what was
already becoming evident- that Disraeli’s bill would not “settle the question”. Shortly
before the great meeting, the Saturday Review had commented: “if the country were
apathetic, and the House of Commons were left to itself, there is probably a good
working majority in favour of making a Reform Bill as much of a sham as possible. But
we do not see that the country is apathetic”. Rather, the people wanted “an honest
measure of Reform”, and thus, if the bill were passed unaltered, it would neither bring
peace, nor be a settlement.289
The increasingly radical statements of the working-class Reformers, the success
of the Hyde Park demonstration of 6 May, and the promises of even greater agitations to
come, had demonstrated that Disraeli’s bill, as it stood, was unlikely to “settle the
question”. Since the need to quiet the agitations and “settle the question” had been
perhaps the most compelling motive for introducing the bill in the first place, it seems
likely that this fact had some influence over the course legislation would take. Whatever
the reason, the rest of May saw the total transformation of Disraeli’s bill in the House of
Commons.
The League had demonstrated in convincing fashion that Disraeli’s bill, as it
stood, served only to intensify the agitations. The middle-class Radicals at the Reform
Union promised to redouble their efforts as well. Samuel Morley urged that the middle
class and working class unite their efforts in seeking real and substantial Reform, and
called for fresh agitations if this were not achieved. P.A. Taylor declared the £5 line a
mistake, because the people could not be rallied under it, and argued that Gladstone could
rally both classes under a call for unrestricted household suffrage.290
Gladstone began to move closer to the Radicals. At a meeting with the Reform
Union, he declared that, while he still held reservations about the merits of enfranchising
the poorer householders, his proposal of a £5 line was “dead and gone”. He promised to
concentrate all his efforts on removing the unjust restrictions in Disraeli’s bill. He was,
in effect, now pushing for the bill to be amended into full household suffrage. If that
failed and the bill became law anyway, he promised to oppose it with all legal means
possible. If the bill were passed unaltered, he warned, it would be “but the
commencement of a fresh conflict, and the signal for entering on a new strife”.291 A
Conservative commentator, arguing that the bill was already very extensive and the
disabilities on the compounders minor, denounced Gladstone for needlessly threatening a
“fierce and turbulent popular agitation”.292
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A series of amendments from the Liberal side virtually turned Disraeli’s bill
inside out. For the most part, Disraeli made little effort to oppose them. The first of the
alterations had come in late April, with the reduction in the residency requirement from
two years to one year. Early May saw the creation of a £10 franchise for lodgers, at the
behest of a Radical, W.T. Torrens, but with Disraeli’s approval.293
The largest unresolved question remained that of the compound householder. A
Radical, J.T. Hibbert, proposed an amendment that partially remedied the problem.
Disraeli had been inclined to accept it, and had promised some Radicals that he would do
so. However, more Conservative members of the Cabinet threatened to resign if he
accepted it. Disraeli was forced to oppose it, and it was defeated.294 It was soon followed
by new schemes to enfranchise the compound householder. One was devised by a
Liberal, H.C.E. Childers, at the behest of Gladstone and Bright. It allowed compounding
only if the tenant requested it. Meanwhile, Grosvenor Hodgkinson, an obscure “advanced
Liberal” backbencher, concocted his own simple if drastic solution to the problemabolish the compound householder altogether by repealing the Small Tenements Acts.295
On 17 May, Hodgkinson brought his measure before the House. Gladstone
delivered an impassioned speech in favor of it, or better, Childers’s foreshadowed
motion. The government, he said, could hardly oppose such an amendment, for it left
intact Disraeli’s “great principal” of personal rate-payment. He had no intention, he said,
of proposing any limitations on the bill’s household suffrage provisions, but he was
obliged to oppose the bill as it stood, with its unjust restrictions, which were “of a nature
most unjust, most vexatious, and most certain to lead to that which we all desire to
avoid— prolonged agitation until they are swept away”. He supported the amendment,
in spite of his regret for the abolition of compounding, because it would provide “an
immediate, real, and liberal enfranchisement”, creating an “immediate settlement” and
preventing further agitations. “When on any great question,” he said, “there is popular
agitation and thousands meeting in the country, protesting against the proceedings of
Parliament, and declaring that . . . they cannot be acquiesced in . . . I can only say that it
causes me great apprehension”. He threatened to appeal to public opinion, and called the
amendment an opportunity, possibly the last, for a settlement that would secure peace,
concord, and general assent both inside and outside the House.296 Essentially, he warned
that an unaltered bill would bring on fresh agitations- ones which he would support.
Disraeli’s response, apparently much to everyone’s surprise, was to announce his
unconditional approval for Hodgkinson’s proposal. Having all along claimed to be
championing a popular bill, he acted as if no great concession had been made. The
proposal was not, he said, inconsistent with his bill, but would in fact strengthen it and
“give completeness” to it. He claimed he had been in favor of something similar all
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along, but had not wanted to overburden the legislation,297 and denied that he had been
influenced by “the terrors which have been depicted, and the agitation with which we
have been threatened”.298
Disraeli had, at a stroke, removed the largest of the restrictions, and thereby
quadrupled the number of new working-class voters.299 As one observer put it, “the
character of the bill was so materially altered that for all practical purposes it became a
new measure”.300 The Radicals seemed delighted. J.S. Mill called it “a great and splendid
concession”.301 W.E. Forster, who would shortly be seen dancing for joy down the
lobby,302 “hailed with the greatest delight the concessions” of Disraeli, which he believed
“would prove satisfactory to the country, which was anything but satisfied with the Bill
in its present shape”.303
When the debate continued on 20 May, Robert Lowe, horrified by the sudden
expansion of the enfranchisement, vehemently attacked the bill and the democratic evils
it would bring.304 J.W. Henley, a Tory squire from Oxfordshire, who in 1865 had
opposed any reduction of the borough franchise,305 replied that the bill was the most
Conservative now possible. In light of the agitations, he felt it a more Conservative
policy to “settle the question” rather than “to let the pot go on boiling till it overflows and
brings us to a much worse state of things”. If nothing were done, “the question would
have gone on from agitation to agitation until it had introduced into the country a state of
things which all of us would be sorry to see”. “No man in the House”, except Lowe,
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“would say that we could safely stand still”.306 Another Conservative, while feeling that
the agitations had been manufactured by Gladstone and Bright, acknowledged that “it
was owing to the popular excitement out of doors . . . that [Disraeli] and his Colleagues
had been compelled to take the step they had now taken”, and reluctantly supported the
bill as it stood.307
Disraeli explained his motives for accepting Hodgkinson’s amendment in a letter
to the Home Secretary, Gathorne Gathorne-Hardy. Forced to respond to Gladstone’s
“meditated coup”, he had made the decision on the spot: “Having revolved everything in
my mind, I felt that the critical moment had arrived when, without in the least degree
receding from our principle and position of rating and residential suffrage, we might take
a step which would destroy the present agitation and extinguish Gladstone & Co.”308
Thus, it would seem that the threat of continued agitations, and the continued attacks
made by Gladstone and the Liberals on the bill’s restrictions, were perhaps the greatest
factors in Disraeli’s decision. This was undoubtedly based on a realistic view of the
situation. The restrictions were becoming politically untenable. The bill as it had stood
had completely failed to mollify the working-class Reformers. Rather than quieting the
agitations, it had made them take a more radical, confrontational approach. As one
Radical put it, “there was no denying the fact that there was throughout the country a
very strong feeling against the Bill as it stood”,309 and Gladstone and the Liberals
promised to exploit this fact to the fullest against the Conservatives. Rather than “settling
the question”, the bill had seemed destined to spark further, and perhaps more heated,
political conflict. Disraeli seized upon Hodgkinson’s amendment because it gave him an
opportunity to make concessions while minimizing the political damage. It nominally
preserved Disraeli’s much-vaunted “principle” of personal rate-payment, while the fact
that it came from an obscure backbencher made it look less damaging than if it had come
directly from Gladstone or one closely connected to him.
The rest of the modifications came rapidly and easily. Disraeli quickly allowed
the county franchise to be lowered from £15 to £12, and accepted the abolition of the
“fancy franchises” with barely a murmur.310 In early April, Gladstone had planned to
replace Disraeli’s restrictions with his own; now he made no attempt to do so. When one
Liberal, Paulette Scrope, attempted to put a lower limit of £4 rating on the franchise, he
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received little support, and both Disraeli and Gladstone opposed it.311 Disraeli was more
successful in resisting changes when it came to the redistribution of seats. Much to
Radical displeasure, the extent of the redistribution was relatively minor compared to the
massive changes made in the franchise, and was considered favorable to the landed
interest.312 This was perhaps a reflection of the fact that the agitations had focused so
heavily on lowering the franchise.
The bill in its final form was, at least with regards to the franchise, a radical,
sweeping measure. Household suffrage, which only a small collection of Radicals had
advocated a short time before, was now incorporated into the bill of a Conservative
ministry. The result was a 138% increase in the borough electorate, plus a 38% increase
in the counties.313 The working class now had unquestionably attained considerable
voting power. If it was not manhood suffrage, it was a considerable step in that direction.
The radical nature of the bill created some misgivings on the part of parliament.
Lord Shaftesbury was of the opinion that “with the exception of a few advanced
Democrats, they all detest and fear the measure”. Lord Grey similarly claimed that most
of the Commons disapproved of what they were passing.314 Said one Liberal
commentator, “if the truth were known, those [MPs] who do not feel more or less
uncomfortable at the thought of the future are very few indeed”.315 Nonetheless, the bill
passed easily in the Commons. One Liberal later commented that aside from a few
Radicals, there was “no considerable party in Parliament which thoroughly approved . . .
the House accepted the position simply because it was inevitable”.316 One writer, himself
aghast at the scale of the enfranchisement and infuriated at those who had supported it,
noted that many Conservatives who disliked the bill and deeply regretted its necessity,
“believed it was the best that could be done under the circumstances, and that to pass it
would be a less evil than to reject it and prolong the agitation, with all the hazardous
possibilities of future discomfiture”.317 The House of Lords, after some abortive attempts
at mischief, allowed it to pass with only minor alterations.318
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The working-class Reformers were largely satisfied with the bill. Beales gave
Disraeli credit for what he did, but felt that true credit belonged to the agitations. “The
Reform League”, he said, “were the real authors of the bill”.319 The Beehive said that
“every wise man must be thankful for the course that things are taking . . . with reference
to Reform . . . After exhausting his large ingenuity to blindfold his followers, and to
circumvent his opponents, Mr. DISRAELI has at last bowed to the demand of the popular
voice”.320
Looking to the future, The Beehive hoped the new voting rights would improve
the condition of the working class. They did not envy the rich, it said, or covet their
wealth. Rather, what they wanted was “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage”. It
continued, “we demand the right to organize our labour . . . we look to educate ourselves
and our children . . . we look for the curtailment of taxation . . . and the more equitable
distribution of those which are inevitable . . . and we shall not be content until we secure
for all the people of these kingdoms justice and equality.” Suspicion was expressed at
both Liberals and Conservatives, whose interests, it was felt, had “little in common with
the interests of the people”. With respect to both parties, it said, “so long as they shall
honestly serve the people, but not one hour beyond, we are their friends”.321 The
Conservatives by and large won few converts by their actions. Lucraft did, in July,
declare that he did not trust Gladstone and Bright and would “much sooner depend on a
Tory government than upon the Manchester party”, but he was vigorously denounced by
Howell322 and censured by Odger.323 The Beehive, while distrusting the Liberals in
general, felt its aspirations more closely identified with certain members of it, the “deep
sincerity of Mr. Gladstone” and the “vigorous bluntness of Mr. Bright” being more
esteemed than “the wondrous dexterity of Mr. Disraeli”.324 The agitations were over; one
more demonstration was held in Hyde Park in August, mainly to defend the right of
public meeting. The Reform League assisted the Liberal party in the election of 1868,
but it disbanded a year later.
There are really two possible explanations one can make for the wide divergence
between the original and final versions of Disraeli’s bill. One could argue that Disraeli
had, with his original bill, tried to placate the demands for Reform, and head off
Gladstone and Bright, with a measure that had the surface appearance of liberality, but
that was in fact quite limited in actual effect. Once it became clear that the bill only
aggravated the working class, and gave Gladstone and the Liberals continued grounds for
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attacking the Tories as obstructers, it became evident that only a truly extensive bill
would both put an end to the agitation and cut the ground from under the Liberal assault.
The other, less provable possibility is that Disraeli had been inclined towards a
wide enfranchisement from the beginning of the session, as the best way resolving the
controversy. The “safeguards” in his original bill, then, had been there to placate the
more conservative members of his cabinet and party, as well as the Adullamites, and he
had planned all along to give them up. There were some at the time who believed this
had been the case. Afterwards, Lord Cranborne accused Disraeli of having wanted a
radical bill all along; all the safeguards had been merely to lure the Conservatives into
accepting it.325 He was not alone in thinking this. In early April, a Liberal commentator
had warned that the safeguards and limitations in Disraeli’s bill were there merely to
mollify his cabinet and his party, and that he intended to have them fall away and leave a
radical bill. If this happened, he warned, there would be little the Liberals could do, for
they could hardly afford to be seen as being more conservative than the Conservatives.
The only thing that might hold Disraeli back was the resistance of his colleagues.326
According to another Liberal, Disraeli had planned a radical bill from the start, but
realizing that it would scare his party if revealed all at once, had only revealed its full
magnitude by degrees, and had thus by subterfuge turned his “great omnibus full of
stupid, heavy country gentlemen” into “Radical Reformers”.327
There is a certain plausibility to this scenario, given Disraeli’s rather
unconventional Toryism, and it would explain why Disraeli’s original bill was such a
ramshackle, poorly designed measure. If Disraeli did envision a radical bill at the
beginning of the session, however, it was probably because of the changed conditions
created by the agitations, which demanded an extensive settlement. There is no evidence
that Disraeli would have supported anything like household suffrage prior to the
agitations, and in fact he had in the recent past vigorously argued that any lowering of the
borough franchise was dangerous.328 At any rate, in the absence of hard evidence, all this
must remain speculation.
Whatever Disraeli’s thinking, it seems likely that a radical bill was the only
successful way out of the crisis for his government. The agitations, as both Liberals and
Conservatives acknowledged, had made the resolution of the Reform issue inevitable. A
restrictive bill, as was made evident during April and May, neither “settled the question”
nor ended the agitations, and allowed the Liberals to attack it. Perhaps the Conservatives
and conservative Liberals could have mustered enough votes to pass a restrictive
measure, but judging by the temper of the working-class Reformers, it would only have
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lead to further agitation, which the Liberals could have exploited to attack the
Conservatives. The only way out was a bill that outbid the Liberals.
Both Conservatives who had supported Disraeli’s bill, and those who had opposed
it, admitted that the agitations had been a major influence in bringing it about. Writing in
Quarterly Review, Lord Cranborne asked the question, “Why did the household suffrage
that was so hateful, so dangerous in 1866, become in 1867 the fitting and proper
settlement of the question?” Why had the Conservatives, so vocally opposed to giving
the working class power in 1866, reversed course so drastically?
“A transfer of power which last year was generally denounced as revolutionary,
has this year been passed . . . hurriedly and with little debate. Such a sudden change
cannot be attributed to calm conviction . . . the classes in this country, whose interest is
opposed to democracy, have no heart to fight329 . . . the apostles of Reform who have the
real credit of their conversion are the mobs who beat down the palings of Hyde Park, or
went marching with bands and banners in the towns of the North.”330
Cranborne was furious at such a display of weakness, which to him set terrible
precedents for the future.331 Regretting the fact that the Tories had, in comparison to
1832, put up so little resistance, he exclaimed, “is it in truth so great an evil, when the
dearest interests and the most sincere convictions are at stake, to go within twenty-four
hours of revolution?”332 Instead, to his disgust, the ruling classes had capitulated:
“The comfortable classes had no stomach for a real struggle . . . they saw in it
ugly visions of the future- labor giving laws to capital, Trades’ Unions rules supreme . . .
they had beguiled themselves with the belief that it was possible to hold their rights
without a struggle, and under that impression they had talked bravely for a time. But
when they discovered their mistake, they took their overthrow meekly and gave up at
once. All they entreated was that the agitation should be got rid of, and the question
settled without delay”. 333
Blackwood’s, which supported Disraeli’s bill, acknowledged the role of popular
demands in calmer fashion. The new bill was not, it admitted, a Conservative one in the
strictest sense. It was in fact a great innovation. However, “the multitude had, for better
or worse, acquired a far greater and more immediate influence on what is called public
opinion than they had ever before possessed.” It had therefore become necessary for the
Conservative government to adjust the constitution to this fact. They had pursued reform
in order to placate the masses, not because they favored it themselves. “Certainly we
must all agree that a constant agitation for Reform is a great social mischief”; if that
agitation can be ended by a measure that will satisfy the populace while preserving “the
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balance of our commonwealth”, then it ought to be done. 334 As a Liberal account
concludes, “the proceedings of [the Reform League] had, beyond all question, a
considerable influence upon the conduct of the Conservative Ministry . . . and by forcing
the subject of Reform upon their attention promoted in a material degree” the enactment
of the Reform Act.335
Cowling says that “parliament . . . was not afraid of public agitation, nor was its
action determined by it”.336 This rather misses the point. To say that the agitations, and
the strength of working class desires that they demonstrated, had a strong effect on the
thinking of parliamentarians, is not to say that they were literally coerced, or that they
made their decisions out of fear for their own safety. There does seem to have been
noticeable anxiety about the coercive potential of the large gatherings, especially among
Conservatives. The threat of “King Mob” was nothing to be sneered at, in a day when
crowd control was rudimentary and the masses often disgruntled. Nonetheless,
individuals such as Beales and Potter were not revolutionaries, and while some of the
Leaguers seemed to find violence not unthinkable as a means of gaining their objectives,
the object of the League was not to overturn the social order, but to secure the working
class a better place within it. Nor were they likely a significant immediate threat to a
state backed by large armed forces.
However, it was hardly necessary for parliament to have actually physically
feared the agitations, for it to have been effected by them. The fact seems to be that,
while there was a reluctance to concede the franchise to the working class, there was a
greater reluctance to risk serious unrest and usher in a period of markedly increased class
antagonism. The upper classes were, as Lord Cranborne complained, inclined to make
concessions rather than risk a really serious confrontation. This is demonstrated not only
by the concessions on Reform, but in the approach to the Hyde Park demonstrations. In
both cases the government made a show of opposition, but then gave way rather than face
further disorder. In the first case, this was belated. In the second case, it was preemptive.
Such behavior would have been unthinkable in the days of the Chartists or Peterloo.
Those against concessions, such as Cranborne, did not deny the gravity of the agitations;
they merely advocated a policy of intransigence and confrontation that their Conservative
compatriots evidently had no stomach for. The fact that the agitations of 1866-1867 never
reached the level of danger attained by those of 1831-1832 was due less to any lesser
degree of strength or enthusiasm on the part of the working classes, than it was to the fact
that concessions were made with relatively minor resistance.
The inclination towards concession was probably encouraged by the moderation
and pragmatism of those making the demands. Unlike the Chartists, the trade unionists
and radicals who led the agitations of 1866-67 had very practical and limited ends in
mind. They wanted social reform and legal rights for trade unions, not a radical
reconstruction of society. The prosperous, literate members of the “new model” unions
334

Gleig, “The Reform Bill”, Blackwood’s, vol. 101 (June 1867), 762-763.

335

Cox, Reform Bills, 88.

336

Cowling, Reform, 3.

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2005

55

Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, Vol. 5 [2005], Art. 21

were in their own way as concerned with social stability as those wealthier than them.
The governing classes might not want to concede voting rights to a working class led by
such individuals, but their resistance would only go so far.
The nature of the “artisan elite” was in fact such that it allowed them to attract
support from the left wing of the middle-class Liberals. While the Chartists had attracted
notoriously little support in parliament, and had had extremely hostile relations with John
Bright‘s Anti-Corn Law League, the Leaguers could count on a large section in
parliament that wanted to go at least a partial way towards giving them what they wanted.
While an alliance between trade unionists and ardent advocates of laissez-faire was
bound to have limitations, it was not without fruits. It at least meant that the governing
classes could not pose a united front in deciding how far to go with enfranchisement.
Instead, the result was, as Lowe complained, “two parties of competition, who, like Cleon
and the sausage seller in Aristophanes, are both bidding for the support of Demos”.337
Cowling says that there was nothing inevitable about what happened.338 It is very
difficult, with any complex event, to say with certainty whether a particular outcome was
inevitable. What is clear is that the working-class agitations played a very influential role
in the course of events. Between the spring of 1866 and the beginning of 1867, they
changed the face of the national debate on Reform. During the debate on Gladstone’s
bill, MPs had felt free to demean the working classes without restraint, and much of the
House had applauded such language. A paltry enfranchisement had been widely
denounced as excessive. Months of agitations put an end to such an attitude, and
replaced it with a widespread conviction that the issue must be resolved in a definitive
way. A government that had gained power thanks to the anti-Reform sentiment in
parliament now felt that it was necessary to deal with the issue.
The bill was shaped and took its final form in a political climate in which, thanks
to the agitations, there was a strong desire to “settle the question”. If, at the beginning of
the session, there had been any belief that the working class might be satisfied with halfmeasures, the continued strength and increased militancy of the agitations dispelled them.
A measure wider than either side of the House really preferred was accepted, rather than
provoking further agitations, or angering the people who, in some form, were now certain
to join the electorate.
Some credit must be given to Disraeli, whose parliamentary dexterity probably
helped considerably in ensuring that the question was resolved quickly and painlessly,
and to Gladstone, who raised the issue in 1866 and helped keep Disraeli honest in 1867.
But it must be remembered that the Reform Act of 1867 went much further than either of
them had contemplated earlier. While the competitions for political gain between
Liberals, Conservatives, Radicals and Whigs, were important in their own right, the
controversy that brought household democracy cannot be understood without seeing that
it was to a great degree the story of popular demands and how they were dealt with. In a
country with class divisions as wide as Victorian Britain’s, the enfranchisement of “the
dangerous classes” could hardly have come about any other way.
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